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Introduction 1 
1 Introduction 
Electric power markets worldwide are undergoing a dramatic transformation as vertically 
integrated regulated monopolies are broken up. Some markets, such as the generation market, 
are being opened completely for competition. This development deserves a thorough analysis 
due to the sheer size of the market; the electric power industry is a billion dollar industry: the 
wholesale market in Germany alone has an annual volume of more than 16 billion Euros. 
Investment costs for a single power plant can exceed 1 billion Euros; these costs are earned 
over a lifetime of more than 30 years. Market participants need the best tools available to help 
them assess the market when they want to act on it. However, size is not the only reason for 
analyzing electricity markets in detail. In addition, electricity generation markets are complex 
and fragile. Müsgens and Ockenfels (2006) show the importance of a proper market design 
for electricity markets and discuss the vulnerability of these markets. This vulnerability 
became apparent to the public when a complete market failure occurred in California around 
the year 2000. Hence, a thorough understanding of the power market’s economics is crucial to 
an optimal market design and optimal investment and trading decisions by the market 
participants.  
Electricity markets differ from many other markets in several respects. Electricity is not 
economically storable on a large scale. In addition, supply and demand have to match exactly 
to prevent costly blackouts and damage to appliances. Furthermore, variable costs differ 
widely between plants and technologies. Neither demand nor supply is constant over time. 
These characteristics of the market are displayed in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Supply and Demand on Electricity Markets (Schematic) 
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Introduction 2 
The supply function is influenced by numerous factors. Among the most important is the 
installed generation capacity. Not all of the installed capacity is available for production. 
Installed capacity can be unavailable due to unplanned outages or planned revisions for repair 
and maintenance. Fuel prices (divided by a power plant’s efficiency) determine the largest 
part of the variable generation costs. The opportunity costs of CO2-certificates increase fuel 
prices. Cross border power trade must also be considered. In addition, the supply function 
exhibits dynamic interdependencies. Power plants have to be started before they can operate. 
The costs for this start-up are independent of the following duration of operation, thus adding 
a dynamic component to the optimization problem. Hydro storage and pump storage 
production are a further dynamic component. On the demand side, the load varies 
significantly over time and exhibits strong seasonalities on a daily, weekly, and annual level. 
Furthermore, both demand and supply (unplanned outages) are stochastic. For this reason, 
some capacity is needed to meet reserve and balancing requirements. The share of capacity 
providing these services is not available for the wholesale market, however.  
The properties described above lead to both seasonality and volatility in prices. Figure 2 
shows how this complex interaction of supply and demand is reflected in hourly electricity 
prices.  
Figure 2: Examples for Seasonality and Volatility in Hourly German Electricity 
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Source: Müsgens and Ockenfels (2006) 
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1.1 Key Issues and Relevance 
The main part of this dissertation presents quantitative assessments of wholesale electricity 
markets. We develop different models to capture most of the features mentioned above as 
crucial to both the supply and the demand side of electricity markets. These models are 
technological bottom-up models calculating market results (costs, prices, power plant 
utilization, international power exchange, CO2-emissions…) from input data. The models are 
optimization models with cost minimization as objective function. A key contribution is the 
mapping of several potentially non-linear features such as non-convexities and uncertainties 
into a linear framework. The linear framework allows us to include the large amount of 
available market data in the model while still modeling the important structural features of the 
market (international power exchange, dynamic effects of start-up decisions, hydro storage 
and pump storage dispatch, as well as reserve and balancing requirements due to uncertainty). 
The results of the models are compared to observed market data whenever possible to check 
the quality of the models.  
We present two major empirical applications in this dissertation. The first is a competitive 
benchmarking study quantifying the degree of market power in the German electricity 
generating market. The second is the evaluation of the reserve and balancing costs caused by 
uncertainties in the wind forecast. Furthermore, we quantify the effects of including some 
non-convexities in our analysis, using the example of the German market. We benchmark 
model runs including start-up costs as well as flexible hydro storage and pump storage 
generation with model runs neglecting these effects. The same is done with cross-border 
international power exchange, which is of vital importance for the centrally located German 
power market.  
These empirical assessments led to an interesting result which motivated us to perform a 
formal analysis of start-up costs. We found that start-up costs (the costs associated with 
starting up a plant such as the cost of pre-heating the boiler and synchronizing the plant with 
the grid) significantly influence the structure of prices but not the average price. This result is 
highly relevant in the context of competitive benchmarking studies, as it shows that the effects 
of start-up costs are negligible as long as a long consecutive time period is analyzed. On the 
other hand, start-up costs greatly change the structure of prices and the results of such studies 
when the analysis is limited to selected periods (e.g. high or low demand periods).  
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A key feature of our approach is the inclusion of several non-convexities which have been 
neglected in most previous market studies. This was critized in the context of competitive 
benchmarking studies during California’s electricity crisis by Harvey and Hogan (2001) – 
with a prompt reply by Joskow and Kahn. This debate culminated after several iterations in 
Joskow and Kahn (2002a). Among other things, Harvey and Hogan pointed out that variable 
generation costs alone are not an appropriate estimate of marginal costs. Opportunity costs for 
international power exchange and hydro storage capacity as well as start-up costs have to be 
considered, too. Competitive benchmarking studies have improved significantly since then 
(see the beginning of chapter 3 for a detailed discussion); ours is the first dynamic competitive 
benchmarking study, however, that endogenously models the effects of start-up costs, 
international power exchange, and hydro storage and pump storage optimization.  
The dissertation’s academic contribution is the development of economic market models for 
electricity markets. We go beyond previous work in several aspects, for example by including 
non-convexities and uncertainty. These extensions allow a much more realistic modeling of 
the economics of electricity markets. The empirical applications of the theoretical models 
make the work relevant in practice, too: firstly, the model algebra used to calculate prices 
clarifies the structure, relationship, and dependency of the electricity market’s main driving 
factors, the understanding of which is essential for all market participants; secondly, the 
modeling framework we present can be used to answer numerous questions; the models are 
able to give quantitative answers to specific questions such as: how much would electricity 
prices rise if the gas price increased by 20%? What would happen to electricity prices if the 
amount of CO2-allowances were reduced in the period 2008-2012? What would the effect on 
hard coal plants (or even a certain unit) be, in terms of generation as well as profits? In the 
past, similar models have been used to determine the value of a major German electricity 
generation company’s physical assets. In another application, the value – and the effect on 
electricity prices – of additional interconnector capacity between France and Italy has been 
determined.1 The models are also very strong in sensitivity and scenario analysis. 
 
                                                 
1  Haubrich et al. 2001 
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1.2 Procedure and Main Results 
This dissertation is based on four articles. Chapter 2 is based on Growitsch and Müsgens 
(2005). In this chapter, we analyze the development of household electricity prices since the 
liberalization of the market in 1998. The chapter covers all components of the price, the 
wholesale component, and the transportation and distribution networks. We also discuss the 
developments of taxes and subsidies in the electricity market. The main result is that the 
liberalization appears to have had no significant impact on total consumer prices, as prices in 
2004 are nearly the same as in 1998.  
However, a deeper analysis reveals significant differences between the price components: 
wholesale prices, which are at the focus of the other chapters in this dissertation, decreased 
significantly directly after the liberalization took place, but increased from 2001 to 2004. The 
latter effect is discussed in chapter 3. Despite this increase, wholesale prices are still lower in 
2004 than they were in 1998. The costs for transportation and distribution networks decreased 
slightly but steadily over time. The prices of other cost components (Renewable energy act, 
CHP subsidies, taxes…), however, rose sharply after the liberalization. This result has serious 
implications, as it means that insubstantial reductions in household prices do not reveal much 
about the success of liberalization or the behavior of the electricity supply industry.  
Chapter 3 is based on Müsgens (2006). The chapter presents a model to calculate system 
marginal costs in electricity markets. The model is a dynamic linear optimization model 
including start-up costs, hydro storage and pump storage dispatch, and international power 
exchange in the equations. We apply this model to the German power exchange for the period 
from June 2000 to June 2003 and perform a competitive benchmarking study. We find that 
prices are very close to our model-derived competitive benchmark in a first period until 
August 2001: the difference between prices and benchmark is only 2% in this period. In the 
following period, observed market prices rise significantly; this rise is not reflected in the 
competitive benchmark: prices are nearly 50% above the competitive benchmark in this 
second period. We also show that this deviation mainly comes from the high demand periods 
in which capacity is scarce. This is in accordance with the theories of market power. 
Furthermore, the chapter contains several scenarios quantifying the price effects of non-
convexities and other dynamic elements. 
Introduction 6 
Chapter 4 is based on Müsgens and Neuhoff (2005). As in chapter 3, we present a linear 
optimization model to determine the optimal dispatch. The model is extended to allow the 
analysis of the uncertainty brought into the market by wind power generation. We represent 
uncertainty by applying stochastic programming with recourse. We parameterize the model 
with historical data from the German power market and find that the short term costs for the 
integration of wind power are low, as there is sufficient capacity during most periods to 
provide balancing services. 
Chapter 5 is based on Kuntz and Müsgens (2005). The chapter presents a formal in-depth 
analysis of the effects of start-up costs on electricity markets. The chapter starts from a 
simplified version of the optimization problem in chapter 4. Using appropriate 
transformations (dualization of the original problem, rephrasing the dual and reconverting it 
into a modified primal problem), we can prove that the impact of start-up costs on the average 
price is very small, which was already suggested by the empirical analyses in chapters 3 and 
4. 
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation. 
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2 The Economics of Restructuring the German Electricity Market 
2.1 Introduction 
A worldwide movement towards the liberalization of energy markets took place during the 
last decade. In accordance with EU law, Germany joined this movement and liberalized 
electricity and gas markets in 1998 by enacting a new Energy Industry Act. However, in 
contrast to other European countries, the deregulation of Germany’s energy markets had not 
been associated with the installation of a regulatory agency until July 2005, when the Federal 
Network Agency started its work. The agency faces a vivid discussion about the German 
electricity prices; the Association of the Industrial Energy and Power Industry claimed in 
multiple press releases electricity spot-market prices to be excessive (hypothesis 1) and 
network charges to be still monopolistic (hypothesis 2). The Association of the Electricity 
Industry whereas blames the German government for increases in energy prices  and refers to 
high additional costs due to the so called renewable energy act and the promotion of 
combined heat and power plants (hypothesis 3) as well as – most notably – higher taxes 
(hypothesis 4).  
In this chapter we analyze the development of the German electricity market since 
liberalization, verifying the hypotheses from above. Therefore, we concentrate the analysis on 
three major aspects: Firstly, we give an overview of the price development in the different 
German electricity industry value chain stages since liberalization. Secondly, we present the 
mechanisms leading to this price development and thirdly, we discuss the underlying market 
design in three key areas of the market and discuss potential improvements.  
Consumer prices are a natural starting point for an analysis of the effects of market 
liberalization. For that reason, we discuss the development of household customer prices and 
their components from 1998 to 2004 in subchapter 2.2. This discussion will give an overview 
of the factors determining electricity prices in Germany and their development in the years 
since liberalization.  
The most important price components will be discussed in detail in the following subchapters. 
Subchapter  2.3 analyzes wholesale generation prices. We argue that the sharp price decrease 
from 1998 to 2000 was caused by a shift in the pricing paradigm from average costs to short 
run marginal costs. We discuss why prices increased again from 2001 onwards subsequently. 
The Economics of Restructuring the German Electricity Market 8 
Furthermore, we analyze issues of market design in the wholesale generation market. A major 
focus is put on real time metering, as it could increase the price elasticity of demand which 
will reduce price spikes as well as restrict the potential for strategic bidding on the supply side 
of the market.  
In contrast to the generation market, both transmission and distribution markets are natural 
monopolies. Hence, questions of regulation and market design are crucial for an efficient 
functioning of these markets. The German government enacted the negotiated third party 
access (NTPA) as institutional frame instead of installing a regulation authority. As 
competition did not reach the intended level, the European Commission abolished the option 
of NTPA. Thus, the German government has to replace the current regulatory regime with 
regulated third party access. The question of how the German transmission and distribution 
markets should be regulated is currently controversially debated. While it seems inevitable 
that Germany is going to introduce a regulatory body, the rights of that body, especially with 
respect to ex-ante or ex-post approval of tariffs, are still debated. Up to now, a cost-plus 
regulation is in place in the sector. Many other countries made good experiences with 
incentive/performance based regulation. We analyze the development of network tariffs (in 
the following access charges) in subchapter 2.4 and give short recommendations concerning 
the future regulatory system.  
In subchapter  2.5, we discuss the influence of politics on electricity prices, focusing on the 
renewable energy act. Even though the electricity tax causes higher costs per MWh, the 
renewable energy act is more interesting for a discussion. The main reason is that the act 
prevents competition in a significant share of the generation market. While the electricity tax 
mainly influences the demand side of the market by increasing the costs of electricity 
regardless of its origin, the renewable energy act distorts the dispatch on the supply side by 
increasing generation from renewable energies while driving competitive thermal capacity out 
of the market additionally. A similar argument holds for the German ‘combined heat and 
power act’2. However, absolute subsidies paid on behalf of that act are lower and predicted to 
decline further in the future. Renewable energies supported by the renewable energy act, on 
                                                 
2  Gesetz für die Erhaltung, die Modernisierung und den Ausbau der Kraft-Wärme-Kopplung (Kraft-Wärme-
Kopplungsgesetz) 
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the other hand, are expected to grow at a steep rate and are hence becoming significantly more 
important.3  
 
2.2 The Development of Household Prices 
Before analyzing and explaining price developments in different market segments in detail, 
we show aggregated developments of household prices. Since they tend to show lower price 
elasticities than industry or commercial consumers and can hence be expected to benefit less 
from liberalization, they seem to be a reasonable focal point for an economic analysis: if 
household prices decreased significantly, it can be assumed that other prices declined at least 
in the same order.4  
The development of electricity prices for household customers from 1998 to 2004 is shown in 
Figure 3. The figure distinguishes the different price components adding up to the final 
consumer price. Looking first at households’ total electricity costs, it becomes apparent that 
prices declined significantly shortly after liberalization but increased again from 2001 on. In 
2004, prices have nearly reached the level of 1998.  
However, concluding that the liberalization of the German market was not an economic 
success would be misleading. For one thing, taxes and subsidies have increased significantly. 
Their share of the final consumer price rose from 25 % in 1998 to 40 % in 2004. This 
supports the hypotheses 3 and 4, indicating that political decisions increased the electricity 
prices. Households’ total costs for generation, transmission, and distribution in 2004 are still 
22 % below their 1998 values. In addition, the success of liberalization cannot be evaluated 
based on a two year comparison. Both medium and long term effects prevent such simple 
                                                 
3  The steep growth in volumes will overcompensate the degression in subsidies per MWh. 
4  We are abstracting from cross subsidization from households to industry before liberalization. 
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proceeding. Medium term effects such as fuel prices5 or hydro and wind availabilities might 
influence generation costs and prices. Hence, the same price for household customers might 
be driven by underlying costs in one case but may well be above costs in another. While the 
first would be an efficient outcome (the good is offered at marginal costs), the second case 
can contain significant inefficiencies. Hence, especially on the generation side, a comparison 
of prices and costs is needed. This is what we look at in subchapter 2.3.  
Nonetheless, the development of the prices residential customers had to pay for the provision 
of electricity, namely generation, transmission, and distribution, shows interesting aspects. 
While the price component for transmission and distribution decreased steadily at a slow rate, 
the generation price components’ development shows more fluctuation. The price households 
had to pay for generation decreased significantly from 1998 to 2000 (- 65 %), but started to 
rise again from 2001 onwards. In 2004, they are still significantly below their level from 1998 
but have doubled in comparison to their minimum values in 2000. Both the driving factors of 
generation prices as well as transmission and distribution tariffs will be discussed in the next 
subchapters. 
The significant increase in taxes and subsidies is mainly due to the electricity tax which was 
introduced with the environmental tax reform. Introduced in April 1999 at the amount of 
11 Euro2004/MWh, this tax and has been increased annually up to 20.85 Euro2004/MWh since 
January 2003.  
Another major and growing share of the tax burden on electricity is caused by the renewable 
energy act. Corresponding taxes increased from 0.87 Euro2004/MWh in 1998 to 
5.10 Euro2004/MWh in 2004. They are predicted to increase further in the future. Besides the 
already mentioned costs inflicted by the combined heat and power act, there are two more 
direct and one indirect fees and taxes to mention: Concession levies are paid to municipalities 
for the right to deliver electricity to the municipality’s citizens. While the levy’s amount can 
be determined by the municipalities, a federal decree sets upper limits. The last component of 
the electricity price in Figure 3 is the value added tax which is 16% during the whole period 
                                                 
5  Hard coal prices can illustrate this point as they nearly doubled from 1998 to 2004. Since hard coal plants are 
often setting the price in Germany, this development should be included in an assessment of an efficient price 
structure. 
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of observation. In addition to the taxes shown the Figure 3, the gas tax should be mentioned, 
since it increases the costs of fuel for electricity generation. This taxes’ effect on electricity 
prices is included in the wholesale electricity price component. 
Figure 3: Development of Electricity Prices, Representative Household Customers, 
Euro2004/MWh  
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2.3 The Wholesale Generation Market 
Before the German electricity market was liberalized, wholesale electricity prices were 
regulated on a cost-plus basis. Vertically integrated generation companies were allowed to 
charge electricity prices in their regional monopolies sufficient to cover all costs. Hence, the 
costs households had to pay for electricity generation were determined by average generation 
costs. It is well known that such a regulatory setting gives incentives for overinvestments. In 
the case of the German electricity supply industry, there is evidence that this happened.  
After liberalization, beginning in 1999 but mainly during 2000, excess capacities and fierce 
competition brought German wholesale electricity prices down to short run marginal costs. 
We show in chapter 3 that wholesale prices were at the level of short run marginal costs at 
least from June 2000, when the first German power exchange started operations, to August 
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2001. Hence, the huge drop in prices from 1998 to 2000 seems mainly due to a regime shift 
from average cost pricing to marginal cost pricing.  
However, excess capacities on the supply side of the market were reduced gradually. German 
plant operators took close to 10GW of generation capacity out of the market. On the other 
hand, new capacity has been installed to a much lower extent. Hence, installed net generation 
capacity in Germany decreased significantly following the market liberalization.6 In addition, 
most capacity additions appeared in subsidized technologies, either combined heat and power 
plants or renewable energy sources. At the same time, increasing demand in Germany (about 
1 % p.a.) further reduced excess capacities. Another factor which has reduced competition in 
the German market is increasing concentration due to mergers and acquisitions. The number 
of large generation companies has declined from eight to four. Both decreasing capacities as 
well as increasing concentration are shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 4: Development of Net Generating Capacities in Germany, 
Excluding Wind and Rail, 1998 and 2003 
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The development of prices and marginal costs will be discussed in detail in chapter 3 of this 
dissertation. In that chapter, we compare prices and competitive short run marginal cost 
estimators derived with an empirical partial equilibrium model. The key result is shown in 
                                                 
6  The large increase in installed wind power capacity does soften the capacity decrease at first glance. 
However, due to the large volatility in wind generation, EWI calculated that additional wind power reduces 
necessary thermal capacity by less than 10 %. 
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Figure 3. From June 2000 to August 2001, wholesale prices are very close to marginal costs. 
However, a structural break is identified between August and September 2001. Prices have 
been significantly above short run marginal costs in the second period since September 2001. 
It has often been argued that prices have to be above short run marginal costs since total costs 
for new capacity could not be covered otherwise. However, this is not necessarily true. We 
understand marginal costs as the intersection of supply and demand, which can be above 
generation costs of the last inframarginal unit. If demand reaches a binding capacity 
constraint, the supply function is vertical and the elasticity of demand determines the price. In 
such a case, prices can – and will in equilibrium – be high enough to cover all costs for new 
investments. Hence, prices equal to short run marginal costs understood the way described 
above would be an efficient scarcity price signal.7 Following this line of argument, the 
difference between marginal costs and prices described in Figure 3 means a loss in social 
welfare. 
Figure 5: Marginal Costs and Prices in the German Wholesale Market 
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However, it is questionable whether short run marginal cost pricing can work in reality. Three 
main arguments have been raised against it. Firstly, offering all units at marginal costs is 
inconsistent with players’ profit maximizing behavior as will be described later. Secondly, a 
                                                 
7  This so called peak load pricing scheme was first presented by Boiteaux in 1949 (in French). An English 
translation appeared in 1960 (Boiteaux (1960)). 
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low price elasticity of demand might lead to excessive prices or might even prevent a market 
clearing. Thirdly, price spikes inherent in this pricing scheme are likely to be unacceptable for 
regulators and politicians which might prevent investments. 
The first argument is probably the strongest. Ausubel and Cramton (2002)8 showed that 
bidding at marginal costs is not profit maximizing in a multi unit auction if a company is 
producing more than one unit – which is the rule and not the exception in electricity markets. 
On every unit but the first, the bidder has an incentive to raise the bid above marginal costs. If 
the unit has a positive possibility to be the marginal unit and hence set the price, all 
inframarginal units will also gain from the higher price. Hence, while short run marginal cost 
pricing gives an efficient benchmark, it is unlikely to be consistent with individually rational 
profit maximizing behavior by market participants. A player’s incentive for bidding capacity 
above marginal costs increases with the size of its capacity but decreases with the price 
elasticity of demand.  
However, short run price elasticity of demand is very low in electricity markets. It has been 
pointed out that the demand side determines the price whenever a binding capacity limit is 
reached. The low price elasticity of demand leads to excessive price spikes during these 
hours. Kahn (2002) discusses this problem extensively. He concludes that prices of 
6000 USD/MWh might be necessary to cover investment costs for peaking units.9 We agree 
with Kahn that the solution to this problem should not be averaging prices above longer 
periods of time. High prices indicate the scarcity of electricity at peak hours. Consuming 
electricity at times of scarcity should be expensive since the corresponding costs for 
additional electricity are very high. However, people will only react on these price signals 
when they are confronted with them. Hence, Kahn proposes real time metering. Real time 
metering can be expected to increase the price elasticity of demand. This would soften the 
price spikes during periods of scarcity. Such a change of electricity pricing seems to be 
necessary, since the public seems to be highly sensitive to price spikes driving both politicians 
and regulators to act on their prevention. Investors will be reluctant to invest if they fear that 
                                                 
8  The first draft of the paper appeared in 1995. 
9  It is important to note that these prices are necessary to cover total costs of investments. These prices have 
been paid before liberalization, but they were ‘hidden’ in average prices. 
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prices will be ‘capped’ during the few hours when turnover is high and plants’ investment 
costs can be amortized.  
Given these arguments against marginal cost pricing, it can be argued that prices in fact have 
to be above short run marginal costs during some hours to cover investment costs for new 
capacity. However, we have not discussed other sources for revenues besides spot markets so 
far. Especially capacity markets could be a way to recover investment costs and provide for 
security of supply. 
To sum up, it is possible in principle to estimate both short and long run marginal costs in 
electricity market due to the relatively good availability of data. Prices above short run 
marginal costs, as currently observed in Germany, are not necessarily an indication of losses 
in social welfare considering the problems with short run marginal cost pricing. A fairly 
complex analysis is needed whether new investments are necessary in the market. If new 
investments are necessary, expected prices have to cover total costs of technologies entering 
the market.  
We already stated our belief that an increased short run price elasticity of demand (mirroring 
short run generation costs) is essential for a proper functioning of electricity markets. Real 
time metering is an important mean to increase the elasticity of demand. Increasing the 
elasticity of demand will not only reduce price spikes but also lead to less variation in demand 
over time. This will result in a load profile that is cheaper to serve. In the future, the demand 
side can also help to absorb a further increase in variation of the load profile brought by an 
increasing share of wind power in the market.  
In addition to that, elasticity of demand will restrict the potential for strategic bidding in 
electricity markets. The more elastic electricity demand, the less profitable are bidding 
strategies above marginal costs and the less severe is the loss in welfare associated with 
strategic bidding. The intuition behind this is that with a higher price elasticity of demand, 
prices will rise less for a given amount of capacity withdrawn from the market clearly making 
strategic behavior less beneficial.  
A last benefit of real time metering could be an improved outage prevention. Arbitrary 
customer cut-offs could be replaced by a market based solution: those customers who value 
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electricity the most would be served, other customers not. While outages are currently not a 
problem in Germany, they might become more important in the future. 
A more recent development is the trading of CO2 emission certificates since the beginning of 
2005. Following EU legislation, these certificates were distributed free of charge, based on 
historic emissions for a reference period (2000-2002). It is efficient and at the heart of the idea 
of emissions trading that the certificate price translates into higher electricity prices. This is 
regardless of whether allowances are auctioned in a first step or donated. However, CO2 
prices can be another mean to increase profits on the electricity market: Exercising market 
power on the certificate market could be a profitable strategy for large electricity suppliers - 
even if it is not profitable on the CO2 market because of increased profits on the electricity 
spot market. It is difficult to assess whether the currently high certificate prices of above 20 
Euro/t CO2 equivalents are the result of market power or based on marginal costs of CO2 
avoidance. While prices below 10 Euros were expected by most studies (e.g. EWI/Prognos 
2005), short time frictions in the market might actually lead to higher prices. For example, 
some countries have still not effectively started trading at all in mid 2005. In addition, short-
run costs of CO2 avoidance might be significantly higher than long run costs. 
With respect to the hypothesis of distorted spot prices, we have to draw a mixed conclusion. 
The analysis showed that prices are above the competitive benchmark for a long period of 
time. This is a strong indication for strategic behavior in the spot market, consumers are 
paying too much. On the other hand, prices in the long run equilibrium can be expected to 
cover total costs in the system. Prices are not considerably above the level of total costs for 
new generation units. Complexity was added by the beginning of the CO2 emission certificate 
trading. Further research is necessary to evaluate whether excessive profits are earned at 
consumers’ cost due to market power on the emissions market or whether high certificate 
prices are an efficient scarcity signals. 
 
2.4 Transmission and Distribution Prices in Germany 
The institutional framework for access to German transmission and distribution networks is 
based on a set of contracts between energy producers and industrial consumers (associations’ 
agreements; Verbändevereinbarungen, abbreviated VV), subject to ex-post control by the 
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Federal cartel office. These agreements implement the EU electricity directive (96/92/EC) and 
the national energy act 1998 (EnWG), into a system called Negotiated Third Party Access 
(NTPA). In contrast to the more common regulated third party access, the German regulatory 
system is not associated with a regulatory agency and a corresponding ex-ante regulation 
scheme. 
In 1998, the first associations’ agreement VV I was implemented followed by a modified and 
expanded agreement VV II in 1999. The final agreement VV II+ replaced the earlier one in 
2001 lapsing at the end of 2003. Since then, it was accepted as a general code of practice by 
law. However, due to the EU acceleration directive from summer 2003, a regulatory authority 
has had to be appointed until 1 July 2004, replacing negotiated with regulated third party 
access. However, the German Government missed the installation of a regulatory body until 
summer of 2005.  
The first associations’ agreement network access was designed as point-to-point transmission; 
the access charges were calculated in regard to the so called contract path principle, based on 
the distance between a supplying power plant and the final customer. This procedure was 
critized for being anti-competitive, as it was complicated and produced comparatively high 
transaction costs (Monopoly Commission 2002, p. 527).  
Due to political pressure, the next agreement VV II replaced the contract path concept by a 
model called access-point tariff (Brunekreeft 2001), which is rather a postage stamp concept 
approach.  
A paradigmatic change in the orientation of the cartel policy occurred in April 2001 after a 
review of network access in the German electricity markets. Since ex-post control of the 
federal cartel office had concentrated on the control of non-discriminatory third party access 
to the networks (Bundeskartellamt 2001), it changed its focus to the level of access charges, 
as the charges have been considered to be excessive (Brunekreeft 2004). Taking this 
development into account, VV II was replaced by VV II +. This latest agreement contains 
basic principles for the calculation of network tariffs, required their publication and 
introduced industrial self-regulation (Brunekreeft and Twelemann 2005).  
The duty to publish access charges was intended to be the crucial improvement within VV II+ 
as being a major issue of the design of a (national) comparison market scheme. Aimed to 
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identify comparable network operators, the agreement differentiates three structural features: 
population density (for low voltage networks) or consumption density (for medium and high 
voltage networks), cable rate (which is the percentage of underground lines of the total 
network), and East and West Germany. This scheme categorizes each network operator; the 
association of system operators publishes network access charges of each operator for typical 
consumption cases as well as average prices (Monitoring Report 2003). To restrict monopoly 
power and to induce regulatory threat, network operators whose tariffs are within the upper 
30% price bracket of their structural category have to justify the level of their charges at a 
board of arbitration, if a network user so demands. However, the board has no final power of 
decision; if the operator and the customer do not find an amicable agreement, the plaintiff has 
to enforce its claim through the cartel offices (Monopoly Commission 2002, 529), which is 
responsible for maintaining the common anti-trust instruments against market power abuse 
(threat of intervention). 
The development of the electricity network tariffs in Germany since the energy market 
liberalization in 1998 has been examined by basically two empirical studies: Kühn and Schulz 
(2002) analyze the tariffs of 78 transmission and distribution companies covering approx. 
70% of the German electricity network. They identify for the period 1999 to 2002 two 
different trends: first, on average, the network charges decreased slightly for all voltage 
levels. Second, the variance of the charges decreased as well. The authors attribute the latter 
development to two phenomena: while the expensive network operators reduced their prices 
over time, the majority of the suppliers kept their charges constant or increased them slightly.  
Growitsch and Wein (2004) investigate the network operators’ pricing behavior, predicting 
what behavior could have been expected for the post 2002 period. Since then, the VV II+ 
increased market transparency, bringing along the common knowledge of explicit intervention 
prices consequently. They argue that the specific design of the German electricity market, 
namely ex-post control, market transparency and the limitation of the threat on the upper 30% 
rule in particular (intervention frontier), induces wrong incentives in the following manner: 
The knowledge of the intervention frontier makes it rational for any network operators to 
adjust its price to the intervention frontier price within their structural class. Cheap operators 
are able to increase their price to the intervention frontier price without taking the risk of 
becoming part of the upper 30% in price on the other hand. This rationale stabilizes the 
intervention price from below. An overall increase in prices is prevented by the expensive 
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suppliers’ rationale; they can reduce the risk of being part of the most expensive 30% (and 
suffering enforced price reductions as a consequence) by decreasing their prices converging to 
the intervention frontier tariff. Therefore, collusion on high prices cannot be stable above the 
intervention frontier. However, with a decreasing variance in prices, the risk of pricing 
beyond the intervention frontier becomes irrelevant, as possible losses due to a cartel office 
intervention gradually disappear. 
These theoretical predictions corresponded to observed price developments. Descriptive 
information on the tariffs’ average growth rate of more than 400 suppliers for the time from 
2002 to 2003 is reproduced in Table 1. Considering the means of the low voltage(household 
related) charges, it seems that they decreased between autumn 2002 and 2003: on average, 
access changes have fallen by 1.5 percentage points, while the median growth rate did not 
change at all. The maximum growth rate was 31% , while the minimum growth rate (which is 
the maximum price decrease) was (-) 39% respectively. Overall, the scale of decreasing 
values is very small. Hence, even if a reduction has genuinely occurred, the averages decrease 
is not important from an economic point of view.  
Table 1: Growth Rate of Low Voltage Access Charges between 2002 and 2003 
 change in percent 
Mean -1.524 
Median 0.000 
Maximum 31.16 
Minimum -38.65 
Standard deviation 6.22 
N 444 
Source: Growitsch and Wein (2004, p. 15) 
In multivariate estimations using data for 370 operators, Growitsch and Wein show a highly 
significant price decrease of expensive suppliers (defined as supplier inside the upper 30% 
bracket); taking structural differences into account, such operators lowered their tariffs by 
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roughly five percent points for low voltage level networks’ access. On the other hand, cheap 
operators increased their prices by four  percentage points . These results indicate strategic 
behavior of cheap suppliers and confirm the findings of Kühn and Schulz (2002). 
Table 2 Growth Rate of Average Access Charges 2002/20031 
 
Model 1 
(low voltage) 
Expensive 2002 
-5.123*** 
(-6.296) 
Cheap 2002 
4.070*** 
(5.614) 
Population density / 
Consumption density 2002 
-0.356* 
(-1.790) 
Cable rate 2002 
-0.113* 
(-1.781) 
East-Germany (yes=1) 
4.731*** 
(5.410) 
Constant 
-0.025 
(-0.026) 
R2 (adjusted) 0.212 
F-test (P-value) 
21.267*** 
(0.000) 
Observations 377 
Test of normality after Jarque/Bera2 
H0a*** 
(0.000) 
Test of homoscedasticity according to 
White2 
H0na 
(0.283) 
Estimation method OLS 
1Significant on 10 %-, 5 %-, and 1 %-level: *, **, and ***; t-values in parentheses. 
2H0a: null hypothesis could be rejected; H0na: null hypothesis could not be rejected; p-values in parentheses. 
Source: Data set ‘Deregulated German electricity market’; estimated with EViews 4.0. 
Source: Growitsch and Wein (2004, p. 20) 
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However, recent developments of network tariffs militates for a change in network operators’ 
behavior. Descriptive statistics (table 3) show a slight increase in mean and median network 
access charges; the standard deviation has also increased (although none of these measures 
increases by more than one percent).  
Table 3 Network Access Charges (Low Voltage) 2004 and 2005: Descriptive 
Statistics 
 2004 2005 change in percent 
Mean 5.466 5.471 0.083 
Median 5.380 5.400 0.372 
Maximum 7.770 7.770 0.000 
Minimum 3.110 3.110 0.000 
Standard deviation 0.572 0.577 0.766 
Source: own calculations based on figures published by the Association of German System Operators. 
From a firm level perspective, VIK (2005) reports an increase in network tariff of up to 20% 
from 2004 to 2005. Both observations could be interpreted as that the regulatory threat did not 
hold any more (Brunekreeft and Twelemann 2005) since the installation of a regulatory 
authority was announced in 2004. Instead, collusion became less reasonable than price 
increases, network operators seem to build up a “price reduction margin”, anticipating price 
cuts by the regulator.  
Recapitulating this subchapter, it can be stated that the German institutional setting of 
negotiated third party access failed in terms of the aims of liberalization. As it is going to be 
substituted by regulated third party access soon, we are going to suggest crucial elements of 
upcoming regulatory setting. Regulation in general, although necessary in utilities industries 
due to market failures, intervenes into market processes and bears specific risks of distortions 
and wrong incentives. As it is therefore unavoidably inefficient, it should be restricted to non-
competitive (monopolistic) market segments. As any regulator suffers from asymmetric 
information additionally, a regulatory system should be as least information demanding as 
possible. The regulatory scheme satisfying these requirements best is from our point of view 
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Performance-based regulation (PBR, sometimes incentive regulation). This method is an 
established alternative to the ‘traditional’ cost of service regulation. While the latter allowed 
regulated companies to recover costs and a (percentage) surcharge (‘cost-plus regulation’) 
PBR establishes competitive market incentives into the regulated markets. Conventional PBR 
set up a revenue or price cap that is adjusted annually for inflation (RPI) on the one hand side 
and reduced by potential productivity improvements (X) to give incentives for eliminating 
efficiencies on the other (‘RPI-X’ regulation). Consequently, PBR creates strong incentives of 
cost reduction. However, these cost reductions may have negative impacts on reliability and 
quality of service. Thus, we suggest a PBR scheme that includes performance indicators 
related to reliability, market efficiency, and customer service. To allow for an appropriate 
calculation of the X factor, we recommend international comparison methods (international 
benchmarking). Given that, PBR is likely to result in reduced cost of regulation, reduced cost 
of negotiations concerning the distribution of utility cost reductions, and improved risk 
allocation between utilities and consumers. 
 
2.5 The Renewable Energy Act 
In subchapter 2.2, we mentioned that the share of fees and taxes for household customers has 
increased significantly since 1998 reaching 40 % of total costs in 2004. While taxes are lower 
for industrial consumers due to several exceptions, the share of regulatory inflicted costs 
increased due to these raises in the years after deregulation. One - major - reason for this 
development is the renewable energy act. 
The Renewable Energy Act (EEG10) was implemented to promote the electricity generation 
from renewable energy sources (RES) in Germany. The revised version of this act has been 
enacted August 1st, 2004. The EEG pursuits several goals: Firstly, it aims at climate 
protection by reducing CO2-emissions.11 Secondly, it aims at increasing the long-term 
security of supply in Germany by reducing the dependence from imported gas and coal. In 
                                                 
10  Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz 
11  Whenever we are talking about CO2-emissions, we always include other greenhouse gases.  
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addition, the consumption of finite resources shall be restricted and technological progress in 
RES generation technologies shall be made. The act also specifies precise targets for RES’ 
share of total electricity generation, namely at least 12.5 % for 2010 and 20% for 2020.  
The subsidy scheme in the EEG is fairly complex. Firstly, it distinguishes between different 
technologies. The highest subsidies are paid to technologies with high costs of generation: 
Electricity from solar power is subsidized with at least 457 Euro/MWh. Nonetheless, solar 
power does still play a marginal role in the German electricity generation mix, as the climate 
in Germany is not favorable for the generation of power from solar energy.  
On the other hand, wind power is a technology where the subsidies has triggered significant 
investments. The subsidy scheme for wind power distinguishes not only between on- and off 
shore sites but also between production potentials. On-shore wind mills receive a fixed 
subsidy of 87 Euro/MWh for at least five years after installation. The lower the wind supply 
at the site, the longer the subsidy applies. After that, the fee is reduced to 55 Euro/MWh. 
Figure 4 shows both the large increase in RES generation in the recent past as well as 
expected future growth which is mainly caused by increased generation by wind power. 
Figure 6: Electricity Generation from RES in Germany, 2000 - 2030 
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Source: EWI / Prognos 2005 
The costs for the EEG are paid by electricity consumers. For the determination of these costs, 
all subsidies are aggregated over all RES technologies in a given year. However, the 
electricity generated by RES also contributes to the electricity system. Hence, the revenue of 
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these sources’ generation has to be subtracted to calculate the additional costs in the system 
brought about by RES. Afterwards, this resulting total additional EEG expenditure is 
distributed on the total electricity consumption in Germany giving a levy on every MWh of 
electricity consumed. However, large industrial consumers receive a discount which on the 
other hand further increases the charge for smaller consumers.  
We pointed out that the subsidies of RES plants decrease over time. However, subsidies 
decrease not only over the life time of a plant but also for new plants depending on the year 
they are built. For wind power, the subsidy for new installations decreases by 2 % p.a. starting 
in the year 2006. Nonetheless, in the near future these effects are going to be 
overcompensated by the steep increase in volumes for RES generation. Furthermore, most 
studies (e.g. the Royal Academy of Engineering 2004) agree that electricity produced from 
RES will continue to be more expensive than electricity produced from conventional sources, 
even if CO2-certificates increase fuel prices for conventional thermal capacity. Hence, the 
steep growth in RES generation is going to increase the costs for the EEG subsidies at the 
same time. For these reasons, the question whether the EEG is an optimal incentive scheme is 
of highest importance.  
For an analysis of the EEG’s market design, we first address the question of CO2-emission 
reductions. EWI participated in a recent study (EWI et al. 2004) coming to the conclusion that 
CO2-emission reductions could be achieved much cheaper by realizing the efficiency gains 
associated with the replacement of older thermal units with new capacity (mainly highly 
efficient CCGTs) and upgrading existing thermal units instead of additional RES generation. 
In addition, unexploited reduction possibilities have been identified on the demand side: 
sectors such as housing could also reduce CO2-emissions at lower costs.  
Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that CO2-emission reductions are not the only goal of the 
EEG. The second goal of the EEG, increasing the security of supply, is difficult to evaluate. 
However, from the perspective of both security of supply as well as depletion of finite 
resources, hard coal has to be considered as an alternative.12 The international energy agency 
                                                 
12  To be precise, we are not talking about domestic hard coal mining which has to be heavily subsidized but 
about electricity generation mainly based on imported coal. 
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(IEA 2004) estimates world coal reserves to last for the next 185 years. In general, these 
reserves are located in politically relatively stable regions: more than one third of world coal 
reserves are located in OECD countries. In addition, hard coal is cheap to store (even though 
it takes significant amounts of space). On the other hand, high pollution, in particular CO2-
emissions, is the main disadvantage associated with electricity generation from hard coal. 
Another possible source to increase security of supply is nuclear power. While nuclear power 
is free of CO2-emissions in addition, this technology suffers from severe disadvantages such 
as nuclear waste disposal and nuclear accidents. In addition, political acceptance for this 
technology is currently missing in Germany.  
At this point, it becomes apparent that RES are competing with other technologies in the 
achievement of the aims formulated in the act. While security of supply could be relatively 
cheaply achieved by increasing the share of coal generation, this is in conflict with the goal of 
climate protection and the restriction of CO2-emissions. Nuclear power could achieve both of 
these goals at the same time; however, at the price of the risks mentioned above. Demand side 
issues – the reduction of energy consumption in particular – have not been addressed 
additionally.  
To sum up, the introduction of the EEG increased electricity prices considerably and will 
increase them even more in the future. In principle, these costs can be justified by the political 
aims of the act. However, we present some evidence, that the related aims could be reached 
with lower costs to electricity customers – in other words: more efficiently.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Beginning with a presentation of the development of household electricity prices for the years 
from 1998 to 2004, we showed that aggregated prices in 2004 are in the same order of 
magnitude as in 1998 (-3%). However, we argued that such a general consideration might be 
misleading for two main reasons.  
Firstly, the price development shows significant differences among the stages of the value 
chain. The generation prices experienced a considerable price reduction of about 32% but rose 
above the level of a competitive market in the years following 2001. Hence, we can draw a 
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mixed conclusion with respect to hypothesis one. Transmission and distribution tariffs 
declined much less (13%) and seem to increase again since 2004. The hypothesis of abusive 
network access charges cannot be rejected therefore. The decreases in generation and 
transmission/distribution prices have been mostly compensated by a significant increase in 
taxes and subsidies (+56%), which definitely supports hypotheses three and four.  
Secondly, we stated that the underlying cost structure - the steep increase in hard coal prices 
in the generation market for instance - might have changed from 1998 to 2004. While such 
effects can be expected to level out over time, they can distort the comparison of a small 
period of observation. For these reasons, we analyzed the different price components at a 
detailed level.  
The main result on the price development for generation is that there is evidence for a 
paradigm shift from average cost pricing to marginal cost pricing happened after 
liberalization. However, prices seem to have risen above marginal costs since the end of 2001. 
Strategic behavior causes a suboptimal dispatch and distorted investment signals. These 
translate directly into a loss of welfare. Nevertheless, this loss of welfare has to be compared 
with the loss of welfare which would result in a tighter regulated market.  
The access tariffs to the transmission and distribution networks decreased rather slightly or 
even remained relatively constant. This – regarding the aims of competition policy 
unsatisfying - result can be attributed to a deficient set-up of the German regulatory scheme. 
The national NTPA design allowed the network operators to set their network tariffs without 
the risk of governmental intervention, as long as their Price was within the cheapest 70% of 
suppliers. In association with an almost perfect transparency on the supply side, such 
incentive caused cheap suppliers to increase their prices. Though expensive operators reduced 
their tariffs due to regulatory threat, the German way of electricity network regulation has to 
be considered to be unsuccessful. We suggested installation of a regulatory agency and the 
introduction of incentive regulation to increase competition in the retail market and to raise 
efficiency reserves in network operation.  
Finally, we analyzed one of the major subsidies in the German energy market, namely the 
renewable energy act. After a description of this subsidy’s structure, we discussed whether the 
aims formulated in the act, namely climate protection, increasing the security of supply, 
restricting the consumption of finite resources and promoting technological progress in RES 
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generation technologies, could be achieved more efficiently by other means. We found that 
every single aim could indeed be achieved in a more efficient way using other means; 
however, a deeper analysis is necessary to quantify the act’s contribution to all aims 
simultaneously.  
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3 Quantifying Market Power in the German Wholesale Electricity Market 
Using a Dynamic Multi-Regional Dispatch Model 
3.1 Introduction 
Most of Europe’s electricity markets are in the process of liberalization. This process started 
in Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries. Efforts by the European Union lead to a 
major movement towards deregulation in continental Europe in the second half of the 1990s.13 
Germany arranged deregulation in 1998 when its new energy law became effective. As a 
consequence, the first German power exchange in Leipzig started operations in June 2000. 
Prices on the exchange have increased considerably since June 2000. In particular, monthly 
base load spot prices (delivery of 1 megawatt (MW) for every hour of the month) varied 
between 15 and 25 Euros/megawatt hour (MWh) during the year 2000 and most of 2001. In 
December 2001, the monthly base reached 50 Euros/MWh. On the spot market, where 
electricity is traded for every hour of the day, prices for the most expensive hours peaked at 
nearly 1000 Euros/MWh in December. While prices returned to lower levels after December 
2001, we show that the spread between marginal costs and prices widened considerably.  
Analogous to the discussions around the California crisis (see Borenstein et al. (2002)), two 
competing hypotheses concerning the cause of these price movements are discussed: the first 
hypothesis is that high prices in the German electricity market are competitive and purely 
driven by factors influencing generation costs such as fuel prices, generation of hydro plants,  
wind power generation and increasing scarcity of generation capacity. The opposing 
hypothesis states that they are the result of market power. This debate has vital implications 
for the evaluation of the success of the whole liberalization process in electricity markets. The 
disadvantages of regulation have to be compared with the disadvantages of market power. 
Market power, understood as the ability to profitably raise prices above marginal costs, leads 
to inefficiencies mainly due to restricted output and suboptimal plant dispatch. Market power 
also shifts consumer benefits from lower prices to generator profits. This chapter contributes 
to the discussion by deriving a competitive price estimator with a complex dispatch model. A 
                                                 
13  A milestone towards deregulated electricity markets in the European Union was the EU Directive 96/92/EC 
which determined common rules for the internal electricity market in the European Union. . 
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key advantage in our model is the endogenous modeling of intertemporal effects and 
international power exchange. A comparison of model derived competitive price estimators 
with observed prices comes to the conclusion that the amount of market power in the German 
electricity market is significant. We leave the question for further research how market power 
mitigation could be achieved by improving market design in the German market. 
Traditional concentration measures such as the Hirschman-Herfindahl index are rather raw 
tools for an evaluation of competition and market power in electricity markets.14 Since 
information on costs of production and other additional market data are available, they should 
be used in an analysis of market outcomes. In a perfectly competitive environment, the hourly 
spot price is given by the marginal costs.15 Mas-Collel et al. (1995) define market power as 
“the ability to alter profitably prices away from competitive levels.” However, it is impossible 
to observe true marginal costs. We have to apply a model to estimate marginal costs from 
observable data. Hence, the difference between marginal cost estimates and prices cannot 
exclusively be attributed to market power. In addition to market power, differences can be due 
to a sub-optimal model or uncertainties in the input data.   
Borenstein et al. (2002) distinguish two approaches for the analysis of market outcomes. The 
first analyzes single companies and their bidding behavior. Among others, Wolfram (1998) 
has conducted such an analysis for the electricity market in England and Wales, and Puller 
(2001) for California. Bower et al. (2001) applied a bounded rationality model to the German 
market analyzing the potential for market power in the beginning of the liberalization process. 
The second approach is at market level. An analysis at market level compares observed prices 
with estimated marginal costs for the aggregated industry supply function. This approach, e.g. 
chosen by Borenstein et al. (2002), Wolfram (1999), and Joskow and Kahn (2002), is also 
followed in this chapter. While this market level perspective is less informative on 
companies’ bidding strategies, the results are far more robust for two reasons. Firstly, a 
disaggregated approach necessitates the analysis of firms’ bidding strategies. Availability of 
                                                 
14  See Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) for a discussion of traditional concentration measures and oligopoly 
models for the analysis of market power in electricity markets. 
15  See Schweppe (1988) for a discussion of marginal costs and spot prices for electricity.  
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firms’ bids differs between countries, and is very low in Germany like in many decentralized 
markets. Estimating firms’ bids would add further uncertainty to the analysis. Secondly, the 
aggregated approach leaves computational resources for a very detailed analysis of marginal 
costs. For example, the quantification of marginal costs involves dynamic aspects, which are 
very difficult to include in a disaggregated model of strategic behavior.  
However, the detailed analysis of marginal costs is especially important in the German 
market. For one, the German power market is highly integrated into the European grid: The 
available interconnector capacity connecting Germany with its neighboring countries sums up 
to more than 13 gigawatt (GW), exceeding 15% of highest load. Hence, international power 
exchanges have to be incorporated in the analysis. In addition, Germany (partly through 
exchanges with Austria and Switzerland) is significantly influenced by hydro power 
generation. Optimizing hydro storage generation adds a dynamic component to the problem. 
Hydro storage plants bid opportunity costs rather than variable costs. Since these plants have 
a fixed energy budget determined by water inflows, the opportunity costs depend on expected 
future prices. Bushnell (2003) discusses the intertemporal effects of hydro storage dispatch in 
a strategic model. Start-up costs are another dynamic issue. They comprise costs for 
preheating and network synchronization of power plants before production. Start-up costs are 
price relevant for plants that, for example, shut down during low demand levels at night or at 
weekends. These costs, however, are most important during peak periods as will be shown 
later. Since market power is usually also most pronounced during peak periods, it is important 
to distinguish clearly between the two. Power exchange between regions as well as generation 
of hydro storage plants and start-up decisions are endogenous to the model presented in this 
chapter. 
We derive system marginal cost estimators using a linear optimization model. The model 
minimizes total generation costs by simultaneously optimizing plant dispatch in Germany and 
other European countries. International power exchange is optimized endogenously. Since 72 
price realizations per month are distinguished, the dynamic effects of hydro storage plant 
dispatch and start-up decisions can also be modeled endogenously. System marginal costs are 
the cost in the system inflicted by a marginal increase in load in a region, taking also into 
account effects in other regions and other periods.  
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Comparing the marginal cost estimator with observed market prices at the German power 
exchange allows a quantification of market power in the market. The most interesting result is 
that the spread between cost estimators and prices increases over time. One reason for 
increasing market power is increasing concentration in the market. The eight largest 
generation companies in Germany merged to only four over the period of observation. Selten 
(1973) argues that “four are a few and six are many”, indicating that the potential for market 
power significantly increases when the number of firms is reduced from eight to four. Other 
studies (e.g. Green and Newbery (1992), Green (1996)) apply supply function equilibria 
models to power markets. These studies also find a significant potential for market power in 
markets with few players.  
However, it is difficult to pin down a date from which onwards an increase in concentration 
changes prices. Firstly, at the time a merger is cleared it is not immediately implemented in 
the organizational structure of a company. It takes an uncertain time span before two merged 
companies really act as one. Secondly, increasing potential for market power due to increased 
concentration is not necessarily exploited. Companies have to learn how to exercise market 
power. The task of reducing output to maximize producer surplus is fairly complex. Both 
effects are difficult to quantify.  
Another factor influencing market power on the spot market are traded volumes on the spot 
market. Allaz and Vila (1993) show that a higher share of long term contracts can lead to 
lower spot prices. Bushnell et al. (2003) use empirical data for American electricity markets 
to show that such vertical arrangements indeed play a role for spot prices. We analyze the 
development of traded volumes in the spot market and the difference between prices and cost 
estimators and find that both rise significantly over the time period of our observation.  
Hence, our data confirm an increase in the difference between marginal costs and prices over 
time. We find that average monthly wholesale prices are extremely close to average monthly 
system marginal cost estimators for the first months (below 2% on average from June 2000 to 
August 2001). Deviations increase significantly in the later months. The average mark-up 
from September 2001 to June 2003 is nearly 50%.  
Statements about the average degree of market power in a month can be amended by a more 
detailed analysis, since our model distinguishes 72 different load realizations per month. 
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However, instead of extensively analyzing single hours, we distinguish periods of high and 
low demand in every month. The results show that market power is strongest during periods 
of high demand. Wolfram (1998) finds evidence for the England and Wales market that more 
inframarginal capacity induces higher bids since more capacity profits from higher prices. In 
addition, less unused capacity during high demand periods can lower the price elasticity of 
supply thus raising the potential for strategic bidding. Prices for the peak hours from 
September 2001 to June 2003 are more than 75% above cost estimators. Much less evidence 
for market power is detected during low demand periods.  
Furthermore, model results allow a quantification of producer surplus. The model determines 
system marginal costs by determining the cost minimal plant dispatch in every time period. 
Marginal costs (equaling competitive price estimators), generation by different stations in 
every period and generation costs can be used to calculate the producer surplus. The analysis 
shows that producer surplus rises significantly due to the exercise of market power. 
To further highlight the implications of our deviation from previous research, we include 
sensitivity analysis on our crucial methodological improvements. We distinguish model 
results with and without international power trade, with and without start-up costs as well as 
with and without varying hydro storage dispatch. In addition, we present sensitivity analyses 
with respect to thermal power plant availability as this is a major source of uncertainty in the 
analysis. We present a further sensitivity analysis to quantify the price effect using an average 
load on a convex supply function. This is achieved by comparing the average of a high and a 
low demand scenario with our base case.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Subchapter 3.2 describes the model developed to 
estimate the competitive benchmark. In subchapter 3.3, the results from this derivation are 
explored with regard to spreads, different demand periods and producer surplus. Subchapter 
3.4 presents sensitivities with respect to our modeling of power exchange, start up costs, and 
international power exchange as well as plant availability and demand. Subchapter 3.5 
concludes the chapter. 
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3.2 Modeling Marginal Costs 
Electricity markets exhibit unique features which distinguish electricity from nearly all other 
goods. Electricity is a homogenous product at a certain time on the demand side.16 Storing 
electric energy is expensive. Electricity flows are grid-bound. Electricity demand is volatile 
with pronounced seasonality on a daily, weekly and annual level. Different plant technologies 
have varying short-run generation costs. These facts lead to large variations in marginal 
generation costs. Additionally, as capacity has to be sufficient to cover the highest demand 
levels, there is unused capacity most of the time. These features have to be considered when 
modeling electricity markets.  
Competitive benchmarking studies estimate marginal costs as the intersection of demand and 
supply. The supply function, called merit order, reflects short run marginal generating costs of 
different capacity sorted in ascending order. Short run marginal generating costs are usually 
estimated as the ratio of a generating technology’s fuel price and the thermal efficiency of the 
plant. Sometimes, other variable generating costs are added. However, the correct 
implementation of this approach is challenging. One key factor to the analysis is that both 
merit order and demand change over time. In addition, some factors exhibit significant 
interdependencies over time.  
Factors changing on a shorter time horizon are fuel prices, and the availability of plants due to 
planned revisions and unplanned outages. The production by non-dispatchable power sources 
such as wind power production and combined heat and power (CHP) generation also varies 
greatly on an hourly as well as seasonal level. Furthermore, the power exchange between 
regions can change significantly over time. Generation by hydro run-of-river plants varies 
according to hydrological conditions. In the longer run, installed capacities also change as old 
plants shut down and new capacity enters the market. The demand side of the market also 
varies greatly over time showing different characteristics of seasonality and trends as well as 
stochastic variations, for example due to changes in the weather. Some factors do not only 
change but are in addition dependent over time, adding an intertemporal component to the 
                                                 
16  One exception is the development of a market for “green electricity”. Here, consumers voluntarily buy 
certificates for electricity produced by renewable energy sources. However, this market is very small.  
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problem.17 Hydro storage dispatch as well as start-up decisions of thermal capacity are 
important examples of intertemporal components.  
A significant innovation in our work is the improved modeling of these features, especially 
international power exchange and intertemporal effects. The studies mentioned above use 
observed values for these arguments whenever available. However, data on these aspects are 
often unavailable. In addition, Borenstein et al. (2002) point out that using observed 
realizations for international power exchange leads to a distorted estimate of market power. 
Observed exchanges are optimized by market participants based on estimated prices in the 
market. However, these price signals already incorporate market power. Since we are 
interested in the competitive counterfactual, it seems advantageous to estimate international 
power exchange in the model as the result of a cost minimizing plant dispatch. 
A similar argument holds for the dispatch of hydro storage and pump storage plants. While it 
is well known that they generate electricity during peak periods, observed production figures 
again are already the result of prices potentially including strategic bidding. Hence, the best 
way to determine hydro storage production is again to include it endogenously in the model. 
Start-up costs are not included in the existing literature since they are extremely difficult to 
include in static models due to their dynamic nature. However, they are important for 
competitive benchmarking studies. One reason is that start-up costs increase prices during 
periods of high demand but decrease prices during periods of low demand. Hence, neglecting 
them might identify market power as the result of high prices during peak periods when they 
are simply an efficient market outcome including the costs to start up new capacity.  
3.2.1 Model Structure 
The first version of the model was developed by Kreuzberg (2001) who also describes the 
algebraic structure of the model in the appendix of the cited publication. The model calculates 
                                                 
17  Production costs Ct at t do not only depend on output at t but also on past and future production levels: 
Ct=C(q1,…,qt,…,qT), where t=1,…,T is a time index. 
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short-run system marginal cost estimators. These comprise fuel costs18, start-up costs, and 
opportunity costs for hydro storage plants. In the short term, investment costs as well as costs 
for labor, and repair and maintenance are sunk. Hence, these costs should not influence plant 
dispatch; marginal cost estimators should not incorporate them. Short-run system marginal 
cost estimators are derived by solving a linear programming problem.19 The objective 
function is global cost minimization over all model regions. The model becomes particularly 
appealing through the numerous realistic constraints. Among the more important are: 
− Generation has to equal an exogenously given demand at every time everywhere in the 
network. 
− Generation is limited by installed available capacities. 
− Power exchange between regions cannot exceed interconnector capacities. 
− Dynamic effects to be considered are:   
1. The total generation of hydro storage plants is limited by a monthly energy budget.  
2. Plants may only produce in a given period if they are started up in the same period 
or have been started in a period of lower demand. 
Before we present the accompanying equations in more detail, some remarks should be made 
on the model’s resolution. The first aspect is the model’s regional resolution. Plant dispatch is 
not only optimized for Germany but also for six other European core regions. These core 
regions besides Germany20 are France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria/Switzerland 
combined as the Alpine region, Great Britain, and Italy. The size of a region is determined by 
the grid capacity. If interconnector capacity is abundant over most periods of the year, areas 
or even countries can be combined to one model region. Power exchange with countries 
outside the modeled region, i.e. Northern and Central Eastern Europe, is determined 
exogenously. Regions are abbreviated reg in the algebraic model structure. 
                                                 
18  Fuel costs for nuclear plants comprise the variable components of front end (buying, transporting and 
processing uranium) as well as back end (treatment and disposal of waste) costs. 
19  This linear programming problem is extensive and involves a total of 400000 equations (with 370000 
endogenous variables) to be solved. 
20  Luxembourg is added to the Germany since there are rarely any binding network restrictions between these 
regions and the largest German generator RWE operates Luxembourg’s largest plant. 
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The next important aspect is the differentiation between different power plants. We do not 
distinguish single stations but aggregate similar plants in groups. Firstly, we distinguish eight 
generation technologies (tech). These are, for example, nuclear, hard coal or combined cycle 
gas turbines or open cycle gas turbines. In each technology, we secondly distinguish 10 
different five-yearly vintage classes (v)21. Due to different fuel prices and efficiencies, 
generation costs for capacity vary between the region the plant is located in, its technology 
and vintage class. 
The time resolution of the model uses 72 different price realizations to construct a month. 
They represent a working day, a Saturday and a Sunday with 24 hours each. The average 
weekly and monthly prices are then calculated using appropriate weighting (e.g.  4.8-times 
working days per week, 1 Saturday and 1.2 Sunday22). In the following sets of equations, lv 
labels the load level. The three day types of working day, Saturday and Sunday are referred to 
with the label dayt.  
One further remark should be made on the notation. All variables endogenously optimized by 
the model are in capital letters. All parameters being exogenous input into the model are in 
small letters.23  
The model’s objective function is given in equation (1). Since the objective is the 
minimization of total generation costs over all regions and hours, all relevant costs enter the 
objective function. First of all, relevant costs comprise variable costs for production (VCP). 
However, in our model, we also consider start-up costs (VCSU), variable transmission costs 
(VCT). All three cost variables on the right side of equation (1) are determined by other 
equations.  
                                                 
21  For example, all German hard coal fired capacity built between 1980 and 1984 is in vintage class 1985. 
22  Public holidays are treated as Sundays. This gives Sundays additional weight. 
23  As the model is implemented in GAMS, we follow the GAMS notation calling everything endogenous a 
variable and everything exogenous a parameter. 
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(1) !P SU TC VC VC VC Min= + + →  
Equation (2) shows the costs of power production. Production costs comprise specific fuel 
costs (fc) and other variable costs (ο) multiplied by the load output (PG). Specific fuel costs 
are determined by the ratio of fuel prices (φ) and a station’s efficiency (η). durdayt is the 
number of days each type of day appears to form a week (4.8 for working day, 1 for Saturday 
and 1.2 for a Sunday). 
(2) ( ), , , , , , , ,P Greg tech v dayt lv reg tech v reg tech v dayt
reg tech v dayt lv
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3.2.2 Modeling Start-up Costs 
Since the modeling of intertemporal effects is such an important part of our analysis, we will 
describe their linear approximation in greater detail. A perfect modeling of start-up cost and 
resulting dispatch decisions would be non-convex. We use a linear simplification to keep the 
model tractable but still try to capture the important elements of the intertemporal effects.  
We achieve this approximation by first transforming the sequential load curve into a load 
duration curve and then adding a horizontal structure to the problem to map start-up decisions.  
Figure 7 shows this approach. In step one, the sequential load curve for the 24 hours of a day 
is shown. The problem with this load structure is to determine which capacity is started-up 
and hence available for production in which hour. One possibility is to keep the sequential 
order and sum over all historic start-up and shut-down decisions to determine how much 
capacity is started up in a certain hour. However, this approach is demanding on 
computational resources.  
Another approach is taken in this chapter by working with load duration curves and 
introducing a horizontal structure. From step 1 to step 2, the sequential load curve is simply 
sorted in descending order. Thus, the hourly structure is converted to vertical load levels. The 
hour with the lowest load is sorted into the first load level (lv1). Using load duration curves 
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instead of chronological load curves is a simplification especially when a load curve has not 
only a global but also at least one additional local maximum.24  
In the next step (2 to 3), a horizontal structure is implemented to enable us to determine 
capacity started up. We distinguish this structure by naming it ‘horizontal load level’ (lh). The 
crucial difference to the vertical structure is that the lowest load level (lh1) prevails all 24 
hours of the day. lh2 prevails 23 hours per day and amounts to the load difference between the 
second-lowest and the lowest load level (see figure).  
Figure 7: Intertemporal Structure 
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The implicit assumption for this approach is that whenever it is efficient to produce with a 
plant in a certain load level it is also efficient for that plant to produce in all higher load levels 
as well.25 We will use the horizontal structure to determine how much capacity is started up at 
any point in time as well as how long capacity has been standing idle.26 The amount of 
capacity that is started up at any point in time (vertical load level lvx) is the sum over all start-
                                                 
24  Kreuzberg (2001) analyzes the simplifications of load duration curves to great detail on p. 61 ff. 
25  This assumption is correct as long as the load structure is single-peaked (as it is the case during the summer 
months). However, it does not necessarily hold when the load structure has two (local) maxima. 
26  Idle times are important as start-up costs are below cold start costs when the plant is still warm. 
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ups in horizontal load level lhy with  y≤x. The idle time is determined by the horizontal load 
level the plant was started up. If the plant was started in lh1, it has not been standing idle at all 
since it is running all 24 hours of the day. In general, a plant started up in lhy is assumed to 
have been idle for y-1 hours – all those hours where the load was lower. The crucial 
advantage is that start-up costs are paid once in the horizontal load level the plant is started up 
but the plant is available for production without further start-up costs in all periods with 
higher demand. 
Using the concept of the horizontal load structure facilitates the interpretation of the start-up 
cost related equations. The start-up costs VCSU were introduced as part of the objective 
function (1). They are the sum of all start-up costs in the whole system, i.e. total start-up costs 
of all stations started up, in all regions (reg), all technologies (tech), all vintages (v), during 
each type of day (dayt), and for each load level (lh). CAPSU is the capacity started up in a 
certain load level and sc are station and load level specific start-up costs of this capacity. 
Start-up costs (sc) comprise both attrition costs and fuel costs. Start-up costs decrease if a 
generation set was only shut down for a short period of time and did not cool down entirely. If 
s are the start up costs of a cold generation set, then (4) gives the start-up costs after a stop of 
length t, with Τ  the characteristic time constant of the plant.: 
(3) , , , , , , ,
SU SU
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As part of the objective function VCSU is minimized in the model. The minimization is subject 
to the following constraints. Firstly, generation cannot exceed the amount of capacity started 
up: 
(5) , , , , , , , ,
G SU
reg tech v dayt lv reg tech v dayt lh
lh lh lv
P CAP
≤
≤ ∑  
Furthermore, not all installed capacity can be used. Equation (6) states that the variable 
CAPSU is bounded above by the available share (αG) of installed generation capacity (χG). 
Installed capacity can be unavailable for two reasons. Firstly, stochastic outages restrict 
availability of installed capacity. Secondly, plants have to shut down for repair and 
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maintenance. We combine maintenance related and stochastic outages in an exogenous factor 
αG. The determination of this parameter is described in the data section in appendix A.  
(6) , , , , , , , ,
SU G G
reg tech v dayt lh reg tech v reg tech v
lh
CAP α χ≤ ⋅∑  
Another important restriction is the minimum load constraint in equation (7). This equation 
states that there is a lower limit (πmin) for plants operated in partial load modus. Usually, 
utilization of capacity started up is not allowed to fall below 60%. 
(7) , , , , , , , , ,
G min SU
reg tech v dayt lv tech v reg tech v dayt lh
lh
P CAPπ≥ ⋅∑  
3.2.3 Modeling Hydro Storage Dispatch 
Pump storage plants are optimized in a weekly cycle. An additional constraint contains a 
maximum load factor per day which is included to capture limited reservoir sizes. 
Equation (8) determines the storing of electricity in the form of pumped water. An energy 
budget Qmax,PS (left side) is stored by consuming electricity for pumping (right side). Note that 
both sides of this equation are endogenous variables.  
(8) max,, , , , ," _ ",
PS P
reg v reg v dayt lv reg hyd PS v dayt
dayt lv
Q P durη≤ ⋅ ⋅∑∑  
Equation (9) determines the use of the energy stored in Qmax,PS:  
(9) max,, , , , ,
G PS
reg tech v dayt lv dayt reg v
dayt lv
P dur Q⋅ ≤∑∑  
Finally, equation (10) states a general fuel constraint for plants. θ, the fuel budget, is usually 
not set to binding values except for hydro storage plants. In some cases it might be required to 
set a binding value for lignite if the pit capacity could not provide the amount of lignite the 
station would burn in the unconstraint dispatch. 
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3.2.4 Modeling International Power Exchange 
Equation (11) shows the costs of power transmission between model regions. These costs 
comprise the national grid entry costs (production PG times the national entry rate τreg,reg) and 
the costs of cross-border exchange (PT times the cross-border tariff rate from region r to 
region reg, τr,reg). 
(11) , , , , , , , , , , ,
T T G
r reg dayt lv r reg lv reg tech v dayt lv reg reg lv
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VC P Pτ τ = ⋅ + ⋅  ∑∑∑ ∑ ∑∑  
It has been pointed out that international power exchanges are assumed to follow contract 
paths. This will be used in equation (13). The only limiting factors for power flows between 
regions are available net transfer capacities (NTC). These NTC values (χT) can be adjusted 
varying their availability (αT) as shown in equation (12). The association of European 
Transmission System Operators (ETSO) publishes bilateral and multilateral net transfer 
capacities (NTCs) for power exchange between countries which are used in the model as 
capacity limits. 
(12) T rreg
T
lvdaytrreg
T
lvdaytrregP ,,,,,,, χα ⋅≤  
Power exchange between model regions and non-modeled satellite regions (Eastern Europe, 
Northern Europe, and Spain) are considered being exogenous based on available statistics. 
Satellite regions are referred to with satreg, the exogenous exchange parameter for exchange 
from a satellite region to a model region is called psatexsatreg,reg. 
3.2.5 Modeling the Demand Constraint 
The demand constraint captures the impact of international power exchange as well as storage 
and pump storage generation (equation (13)). Load (l) in each region and each hour has to be 
covered by generation and imports. Load (l) is an exogenous parameter assumed to be price 
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inelastic.27 Domestic generation, PG, minus electricity consumption of domestic pump storage 
stations, PP is domestic net production. The power exchange balance of imports and exports 
(PTr,reg +psatexsatreg,reg -Preg,r) is the second source to cover demand. Imports from model 
regions are reduced for transmission losses (νT). Transmission losses amount to 
approximately 10% per 1000 km of average transportation distance (δ) independent of the 
utilization level of the interconnectors.  
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System marginal costs – our competitive benchmark – are the marginal (‘shadow price’ or 
dual variable) of this demand restriction. They can be directly derived from the optimization 
problem. Loosely speaking, they answer the question how total costs (the objective variable) 
in the whole system (over all time periods and in all regions) would change if the demand in 
hour t (lt) was increased by one unit. 
 
3.3 Empirical Results 
In this subchapter, we will present the results from the application of the model to the German 
power market. Following a very brief presentation of some disaggregated results for the three 
characteristic days per month distinguished in the model, aggregated monthly average prices 
and costs will be analyzed. Afterwards, high demand and low demand periods will be 
                                                 
27  Inelastic demand has the problem that the market might not clear if there is insufficient capacity. This is 
solved in the model by adding a ‘value of lost load’ (VOLL) technology with variable generation costs of 
2000 Euro/MWh. However, demand can be served with regular technologies at all times in the section on 
empirical results. This changes in the sensitivity analyses without international exchange and hydro storage 
flexibility where VOLL sets the price occasionally (see subchapter 3.4). 
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analyzed separately. This is done to test the hypothesis that market power is strongest during 
high demand periods. In the last part of this subchapter, we will analyze changes in producer 
surplus due to the deviation of prices from marginal costs. 
The German electricity market is the largest in Europe. Total net consumption summed up to 
532 TWh in 2000. Total installed net generating capacity at the beginning of the year 2000 
amounted to 116 GW (25% hard coal, 22% gas, 18% nuclear power, 18% lignite, 8% hydro 
power, 5% wind, 4% oil and others). The highest share of the German electricity market is 
covered by long term contracts. The spot market for electricity comprises an over-the-counter 
(OTC) and an exchange-based branch. The amount of electricity traded on the spot market 
increased continuously during our period of observation. We will show later that the largest 
share of the spot market is traded on the power exchange. We therefore compare average spot 
prices from the power exchange28 with our cost estimators, assuming a working arbitrage 
between the different spot markets.  
The approach in this chapter overestimates the capabilities of market participants resulting in 
a downward bias of system marginal costs: The model assumes perfect foresight concerning 
fuel prices, load, electricity generation from wind, and other sources, and excludes any market 
frictions. The market is assumed to be free of arbitrage opportunities. These market frictions 
raise prices above our competitive benchmark even in the absence of market power. However, 
the effect should decrease over time as market participants learn to operate more efficiently. 
This is in contrast to our results which exhibit widening spreads between prices and 
competitive benchmark. 
In addition, information about supply and demand data is incomplete. It is therefore not 
possible to replicate exactly the situation seen by the power plant operators. Data uncertainty 
may lead to an overestimate or underestimate of marginal costs. We will perform sensitivity 
analyses in subchapter 3.4 and give a description of input data in appendix A to develop a 
feeling for both model and data accurateness. 
                                                 
28  From August 2000 to July 2002 two separate power exchanges were operating in Germany. We use the 
volume weighted average price of the two exchanges as market price in this period. 
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3.3.1 Presentation of Marginal Costs and Prices 
Figure 8 gives examples of hourly price curves for Germany. Each diagram contains 24 hours 
for a typical working day, Saturday and Sunday. The EEX prices are obtained by averaging 
realizations of all days belonging to the relevant type of day (working days, Saturdays or 
Sundays plus public holidays) at a certain hour in the month. The exchange’s price 
realizations are compared with the model’s estimated competitive benchmarks. It can be seen 
that the model reflects the structure of the EEX prices fairly well during January and August 
2001. Prices and SMC estimators differ greatly during December 2001. Prices are two or 
three times as high as cost estimates especially during high price periods. 
Figure 8: Hourly Average Prices and SMC Estimators, Germany 2001 
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To allow a formal comparison of the price differences the hourly realizations are aggregated 
into a monthly base, peak and off-peak realization. A monthly base realization is calculated 
by averaging all hourly price realizations at the exchange. Model estimates are time-weighted 
averages of the 72 realizations per month.  
Workday Saturday Sunday Workday Saturday Sunday Workday Saturday Sunday 
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Figure 9: Monthly Averages – Price and Cost Estimators 
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Figure 9 visualizes a key observation in this chapter. The development of the difference 
between model estimates and market prices over time is striking. A simple graphical analysis 
shows that the coherence between costs and prices is much stronger at the beginning of the 
observation period.  
To get a better feeling for the development of the spread between prices and competitive 
costs, we subdivide the observation period in two sub-periods. In a first period from June 
2000 to August 2001 there is no evidence for market power.29 The ratio of monthly EEX 
prices to average monthly marginal cost is nearly 0.99. Hence, prices are even slightly below 
estimated marginal costs. Short-run marginal costs should be a lower bound for prices. As 
was pointed out before, both suboptimal bids by market participants and uncertainties in 
model input data do possibly lead to SMC estimates above prices. For the period after the 
structural break, the ratio of prices to costs increases to 1.45. While marginal costs fell from 
the first to the second period, prices increased significantly. This caused the strong increase in 
differences between prices and costs. 
                                                 
29  The length of this sub-period is suggested by a QLR-test for the most likely statistical date for a structural 
break in the price-cost margins. 
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How can this significant increase in price-cost-margins over time be explained? Several 
factors influencing competition have changed during our period of observation:  
− concentration in the market increased, 
− competition was reduced due to a load increase combined with capacity reductions, 
− the share of energy sold on longer-term contractual arrangements decreased as spot 
market trading increased. 
When the German electricity market was liberalized, eight major integrated generation 
companies dominated the market. During the years 2000 and 2001, mergers and acquisitions 
reduced this number to four. RWE and VEW merged but kept the name RWE. Preussen 
Elektra and Bayernwerk merged to E.ON. Swedish Vattenfall first bought HEW. Afterwards, 
HEW, VEAG, and BEWAG merged to form Vattenfall Europe. In addition, French EdF 
bought a major share of the south-western player EnBW. At the same time, the amount of 
installed thermal generating capacity was reduced by about four GW in the years from 2000 
to 2003. Shut downs or conservations of more than 10 GW have not been balanced by 
additions of about 6 GW. However, such effects do not directly translate into strategic bidding 
and prices above system marginal costs. The reason is that a potential for strategic behavior is 
not necessarily exploited. Firstly, a merger has to be implemented in the organizational 
structure of a company. Secondly, companies have to learn how to exploit the potential for 
strategic bidding. Thirdly, implicit threats of regulatory interference can keep prices down. 
Hence, it is out of the question that the potential for strategic bidding increased in the German 
market. Gathering data on these factors and using them as explanatory variables is left for 
further research. 
Another line of reasoning was started by Allaz and Vila in 1993. They analyze optimal 
bidding strategies for strategic players optimizing their supply on both a spot and a forward 
market under Cournot competition. They argue that in equilibrium firms’ competition in the 
forward market increases their output commitments thus bringing prices closer to competitive 
levels. It is very plausible that strategic behavior on the spot market is less attractive for firms 
if they have already sold their output under long-term contracts. While this argument is 
somewhat static in nature, Bushnell et al. find empirical evidence for the US that a higher 
forward contract coverage does – ceteris paribus – lead to lower spot prices. For this reason, 
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we show prices, competitive benchmarks and the amount of electricity traded on the German 
spot market in Figure 10.30  
Initially one might not expect a link between Enron’s bankruptcy and the German electricity 
prices as Enron did hardly own plants in Germany31, international flows did not change 
significantly, and demand was not altered. However, Enron had large contracted positions 
with both the supply and the demand side. They had to be replaced and the GPI data indeed 
shows a 17% increase in the volumes of spot market trading for November 2001 (Figure 10). 
These increased volumes in the spot market raise the incentive for strategic players to increase 
prices. While this might help to explain the relatively high spread between prices and 
competitive benchmark in November 2001, it does not answer all questions for December 
2001, were prices reached all-time records of up to 2000 Euro/MWh. 
Figure 10: Relation between Traded Volumes on the German Spot Market (TWh, 
right axis), Prices, and Cost Estimators (Euro/MWh, left axis) 
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30  GPI stands for ‘German Power Index’. This index is computed by DowJones based on voluntary declarations 
of agreed deals by market participants. Hence, total traded volumes in the spot market might be higher than 
those in the figure. In addition, we estimated GPI data for the year 2000 as being equal to the average of the 
year 2001. 
31  The single exception was a 50% share in a 106 MWnet CHP plant. 
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3.3.2 Comparison of High and Low Demand Periods 
It is often argued that market power is higher during high demand periods than during low 
demand periods. Both a higher amount of inframarginal capacity profiting from higher prices 
and the amount of free capacity are intuitive reasons for this. The higher price-cost margin for 
peak periods in Figure 11 relative to off-peak periods in Figure 12 supports this hypothesis.32  
The ratio from prices to costs increases from 1.09 in first period to 1.75 in the second period.  
Figure 11: Monthly Averages Peak Hours– Prices and Cost Estimators 
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The same type of analysis for the off-peak periods shows a very different result. However, 
Figure 12 shows that the deviation between marginal costs and prices is much smaller. The 
ratio of prices to cost estimators is 0.9 in the first period and rises to 1.21 in the second period.  
                                                 
32  The peak period comprises Monday to Friday from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m. (including public holidays). All other 
hours are contained in off-peak realizations. 
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Figure 12: Monthly Averages Off-Peak Hours – Prices and Cost Estimators 
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3.3.3 Producer Surplus 
How do higher prices translate into higher profits for the electricity supply industry? Producer 
surplus is determined by hours of generation, production costs and prices. In the competitive 
benchmarking case, all three are determined by the model. The model optimizes plant 
dispatch by minimizing production costs. These data can be used to determine producer 
surplus for the capacity in the model by multiplying generation with the competitive price 
estimator and subtracting variable generation costs.33 Estimated producer surplus earned in 
the competitive counterfactual can be compared with contribution margins earned by selling 
in the EEX spot market. Here we assume the simulated plant dispatch and production costs 
but use EEX spot prices instead of competitive estimators as prices. Most likely, plant 
dispatch under strategic behavior is not cost minimal, and production costs would increase 
compared to the competitive scenario. 
                                                 
33  Non-dispatchable generation is not considered in the following calculation of revenues since its dispatch is 
not optimized by the model. This is because data on the generation cost of combined production of heat and 
power plants is difficult to obtain. 
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A major share of capacity is bound by long-term contracts and is thus not directly influenced 
by higher spot prices. Hence, the results presented in this subchapter can be seen as an upper 
limit for producer surplus under strategic behavior.  
We do not perform a comparison of contribution margins for all 37 months but instead 
subdivide the period of observation in two (June 2000 to August 2001 and September 2001 to 
June 2003). Since these two periods do not have the same length, a comparison of absolute 
figures is misleading. For that reason, monthly average costs and revenues are calculated in 
both periods. Figure 13 contains monthly average revenues and costs for both periods.  
Figure 13: Monthly Average Revenue, Costs, and Producer Surplus 
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Revenues for the first period are very similar for the competitive benchmark and realized 
market prices. Monthly average revenues for all modeled capacity in Germany amount to 
about 727 million Euros in both cases. Monthly average generation costs are defined to be the 
same in both cases. They amount to 345 million Euros. Since producer surplus is the 
difference of revenues and variable costs, they are also the same and amount to a monthly 
figure of 382 million Euros. At this point it is interesting to note that even in a competitive 
environment, inframarginal plants earn significant profit contributions. 
Average monthly revenues for the second period are 620 million Euros using the competitive 
price estimator and 956 million Euros for EEX prices. Producer surplus increases from 
294 million Euros using competitive price estimates to 630 million Euros using market prices. 
This is an average monthly difference in producer surplus of 336 million Euros. It is 
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interesting to note that the extra profit gained in December 2001 was 1.4 billion Euros. While 
observed prices are 47% above SMC estimators for the second period, producer surplus 
calculated using EEX prices are even 114% above producer surplus under SMC. The reason is 
that marginal costs cover both production costs and producer surplus while the increase in 
prices due to market power exclusively raises producer surplus. In addition, it should be noted 
that competitive estimates of revenues, costs, and producer surplus is all lower in the second 
period than in the first. This is mainly caused by lower prices for hard coal and gas in the 
second period leading to lower price estimators. Lower prices lead to lower revenues 
especially for inframarginal capacity such as nuclear, lignite and hydro generation. Hence, 
there seems to be no reason other than strategic behavior for the observed price increase in the 
second period. 
If prices above long run marginal costs of new capacity trigger new market entry by non-
strategic players, strategic prices should not significantly exceed long run marginal costs. 
Analyzing EEX price data for the year 2003, we find that prices are still slightly below long 
run marginal costs of a new CCGT plant.34  
 
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
The model structure and the quality of input data are reasons besides market power why 
prices deviate from model-estimated competitive benchmarks. We test how robust the results 
are to changes in the model assumptions.  
In the first part of this subchapter, we quantify the impact brought about by our improved 
modeling of international power exchange and intertemporal effects. This also gives a feeling 
for the effect of changes in the model structure. In the second part of this subchapter, we 
further analyze the robustness of our results. We achieve this by varying the crucial but 
unobserved input parameter plant availability. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of using 
average load curves in the model, another methodological aspect.  
                                                 
34  Long run marginal costs include labor costs, repair and maintenance costs, and annualized investment costs 
in addition to short run cost. 
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3.4.1 Quantification of Model Improvements 
We vary the three key factors international power exchange, start-up costs and hydro storage 
dispatch to test the sensitivity of resulting dispatch and prices. The efficient benchmark is in 
all three cases the endogenous optimization of the variable. To compare these results with a 
clear cut benchmark, we chose rather simple alternatives. In the case of international power 
exchange, we set German power exchange equal to zero in all periods.35 The scenarios 
without start-up costs abstract from all start-up costs fixing them equal to zero. In the 
scenarios with inflexible hydro storage production, we do not set the generation of storage 
plants to zero but instead assume that the historic available hydro energy inflow is produced at 
a flat level during all hours of the year. In effect, this means assuming that all hydro energy is 
generated by run-of-river plants and not reacting on price signals. Pump storage generation is 
set to zero.36 
We calculate all possible combinations of these three factors thus computing eight different 
scenarios. The scenario which optimizes all three variables endogenously is equivalent to the 
base case analyzed to great extend in subchapter 3.3. The scenario without endogenously 
optimizing any of these variables represents a static merit order analysis. The results are 
presented in Table 4 (aspects endogenously optimized are indicated with a ‘yes’).  
We show the results for the two sub-periods mentioned in subchapter 3.3 (June 2000 to 
August 2001 and September 2001 to June 2003). In each sub-period we distinguish the base 
price covering all hours of the period, the peak price covering only the hours from 8 a.m. to 8 
p.m. on working days. The off-peak hours again cover all hours except peak hours. ‘Max’ is 
the average of the most expensive hour in each month over all months in the sub-period. 
Analyzing selected results, we want to stress again that observed market prices are fairly close 
to the base scenario (yes, yes, yes) during the first sub-period but different during the second. 
                                                 
35  This is very close to the annual average as netted power exchange over the year is very small in Germany 
(e.g. about 1 TWh in both 2001 and 2002). However, both aggregated imports and exports amount to about 
45 TWh (UCTE statistical yearbook 2002).  
36  In addition, we assume that CHP and wind generation are constant over the year. This is done to generate a 
setting comparable to a simple merit order analysis if all three aspects are fixed to the historic average. 
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Furthermore, it is interesting to compare the base scenario with the three scenarios where just 
one argument is not optimized endogenously (nyy, yny, yyn). Comparing the base scenario 
(yyy) and the case without international power exchange (nyy), we find that the base price 
increases significantly. This highlights the importance of international power exchange for the 
German electricity system – and the importance of modeling this variable correctly. 
Furthermore, we find that the effect is exclusively coming from the peak periods when 
Germany is profiting from cheap imports – a large share of which is hydro storage production 
from the Alpine countries and Northern Europe.  
Looking at the effect of start-up costs, we compare yyy with yny. We find that the base price 
is nearly unchanged, but peak prices (and especially the maximum) are increased by start-up 
costs and off-peak prices decreased. Lucas and Taylor (1994) discuss start-up costs and their 
influence on marginal costs. They give the intuition that a load increase during most periods 
can be served by an earlier start-up (or later shut-down) of a plant that has to be started up 
anyway. The exception is the period with highest load for thermal plants. In this period, a load 
increase has to be served by otherwise unused capacity. Hence, start-up costs are cost 
relevant. During the lowest demand periods, the opposite can be observed. During the lowest 
demand period, a load increase increases variable operating costs but saves a start-up in the 
next period since more capacity can be operated without interruption. While start-up costs 
hardly change the base price, it is nonetheless advantageous to include them in a model. 
Otherwise, high prices during peak periods might be wrongly attributed to market power. This 
is especially important if only parts of the observation period are analyzed, for example high 
price periods.  
Furthermore, we compare the results of a flat hydro storage dispatch (yyn) with the base case. 
This comparison is interesting as it shows the effect of a redirection of hydro energy 
production. We do not change the total amount of hydro energy in the system. We see that the 
effect on the base price is noticeable especially in the second period. This is partly caused by 
the reduction of excess capacity which makes thermal production in the high demand periods 
more expensive (and hence increases the value of hydro production in these hours). In 
general, we find that peak prices are greatly reduced by the flexibility of hydro while off-peak 
prices are increased as hydro energy shifts from off-peak to peak periods when the dispatch is 
flexible over time.  
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While we leave the interpretation of the rest of the table to the reader, the results for the 
second sub-period in the two scenarios with neither international exchange nor flexible hydro 
storage dispatch (nyn and nnn) need explanation. Under these circumstances, capacity inside 
Germany is not sufficient to cover load. Hence, prices during the highest demand periods in 
some months are set by the value of lost load.37 These tight situations of supply and demand 
lead to very high cost maxima raising both base and peak cost estimators. However, the fact 
that load cannot be served without cross-border trade and hydro flexibility during these 
periods seems more interesting in the context of the current analysis than the absolute height 
of resulting costs. 
Table 4: Cost Estimates Depending on Model Set Up [Euro/MWh] 
Period 1: Jun 2000 to Aug 2001 Period 2: Sep 2001 to Jun 2003
Base Peak Off Peak Max Base Peak Off Peak Max
Market Price 20.00 27.24 15.96 39.71 25.20 37.07 18.68 66.15 
Trade
Start-Up 
Cost
Hydro 
flexible
yes yes yes 20.30 25.01 17.68 47.18 17.38 21.57 15.05 38.50 
no yes yes 24.18 34.85 18.26 79.14 22.02 33.07 15.86 81.47 
yes no yes 20.43 22.96 18.98 24.79 17.50 19.97 16.09 22.19 
yes yes no 21.26 30.03 16.36 54.89 20.84 31.48 14.90 54.04 
no no yes 23.93 31.00 19.93 52.58 21.66 29.43 17.26 60.16 
no yes no 24.49 37.64 17.15 78.56 66.71 151.33 19.59 252.62 
yes no no 21.14 27.16 17.71 32.91 20.46 28.37 16.00 33.83 
no no no 23.55 33.64 17.84 47.52 60.80 134.00 19.95 226.38  
3.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis on Thermal Plant Availability and Average Load  
In the first scenario in this subchapter, we analyze one of the main sources for uncertainty in 
the model data, namely the availability of thermal generation capacity. While data on a 
monthly level is available for nuclear stations in all countries, the only German data currently 
available for regular thermal power stations’ availability is historic averages before our period 
of observation (see appendix A). We reduce the availability of all German capacity by an 
additional 10 % beyond historic averages used in the base scenario. The second scenario 
                                                 
37  We assumed a value of lost load (VOLL) of 2000 Euro/MWh. VOLL is needed in these two scenarios only; 
there is no capacity shortage in the system in any of the other scenarios.  
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evaluates the error made by optimizing three representative days per month (with 72 different 
hours distinguished) instead of 30 days (with 720 hours). If the supply function is convex, 
optimizing dispatch for average load curves underestimates system marginal costs. We 
quantify this effect by looking at the average of a high demand scenario (German demand 
increased by 10%) and a low demand scenario (German demand reduced by 10%).  
The results ob both scenarios are presented in Figure 14. Reducing the availability of German 
capacity leads to a significant price increase. However, the price increase is still below 
observed prices in the second period. On the other hand, the competitive benchmark is now 
persistently above observed prices in the first period. Hence, if wrong assumptions on plant 
availability should be the reason for the difference between our competitive benchmark and 
prices, plant availability must have been much lower in the second period of observation than 
in the first. 
While plant availability has a rather large effect on marginal costs, the effect of convexities in 
the supply function seems to be a minor aspect. We find that the average of a high and a low 
demand scenario is above the base case for nearly all months. However, the magnitude of the 
effect seems to be negligible. Further analysis not included in Figure 14 reveals that the 
scenario with a 10% demand increase is very similar to the case with the 10% reduction in 
plant availability. 
Figure 14: Monthly Averages – Sensitivity Analysis 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes the extent of market power in the German wholesale electricity market. 
In contrast to previous competitive benchmarking studies, we include dynamic aspects and 
international power exchange when calculating the benchmark. The linear optimization model 
we present incorporates these aspects by simultaneously optimizing 72 hours instead of just 
one point in time. We use this model to quantify the market power by comparing a marginal-
cost-based competitive price estimator with observed power prices on the electricity spot 
market. Strategic behavior is identified as the main reason for the difference between 
marginal costs and prices.  
The methodology presented in this article can be applied to any power market. The method is 
well suited for markets with a large share of hydro storage capacity as hydro storage dispatch 
decisions are intertemporal. However, it is also suited for markets dominated by thermal 
generation capacity as it captures important features of intertemporal start-up costs. It is 
particularly appealing in markets with a high importance of interregional power exchange. 
We apply the model to the German power market. There is no evidence for market power at 
the beginning of our observation period. In the months from June 2000 to August 2001, 
monthly average prices are nearly identical to marginal cost estimates. However, there is 
strong evidence of market power in the later months. In the period from September 2001 to 
June 2003, prices are on average nearly 50% above estimated costs. Mostly, these price 
differences lie in periods of high demand. In the second period, prices are 75% higher than 
cost estimators for these high demand phases. Producer surplus based on EEX prices are also 
calculated: in the second period, they are more than double compared to the competitive 
benchmark. 
Increased concentration was named as one potential reason for the evidenced increase in 
producer surplus and market power. Another potential reason is learning which unfortunately 
is not easily measured and thus also difficult to quantify. However, electricity spot market 
auctions repeated on a daily basis will no doubt have led to more sophisticated bidding 
strategies. Furthermore, increased spot market volumes may raise the incentive to employ 
strategic behavior as it becomes more attractive. We find that both traded volumes on the spot 
market as well as strategic mark-ups increase over time.  
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Regardless of the origins of market power, the careful analysis of supply and demand 
situations is absolutely crucial for an understanding of electricity markets and possibly 
resulting market power. Even in perfectly competitive markets, we can expect strong variation 
in prices over time and price spikes during extremely tight situations of supply and demand. 
In addition, due to differences on both the supply and the demand side, competitive prices 
have to be different for different regions as long as they are not linked through sufficient 
interconnectors. Hence, high prices alone are no proof of market power and, subsequently, 
associated inefficiencies and rent shiftings. Most empirical studies determine marginal cost 
estimators by simply moving hourly load (demand) over a static supply curve. However, the 
supply functions of different periods are interdependent and they are not constant over time. 
Non-dispatchable energy sources such as wind power and combined heat and power plants 
vary from hour to hour and influence the time-specific supply function significantly. 
International power exchange, start-up costs, hydro storage plants’ opportunity costs and 
provision of reserve power are important and were thus modeled endogenously in this 
chapter.  
By quantifying the degree of market power in the market, the chapter sheds light on the 
discussion of recent price rises in the German electricity industry. Strategic bidding by 
generating companies seems to be the primary source for price increases in the German 
market. Changes in fuel prices, capacities and demand play a minor role. Average marginal 
cost estimators during the second period were below the average of the first period while spot 
prices in the market were much higher. This result is important for the discussion of the 
success of market liberalization and deregulation. Market power is one of the key problems in 
deregulated markets. Potential changes in regulation and market design have to be considered 
if the degree of market power is too large. However, the quantification of “too large” is 
difficult. The disadvantages of deregulated markets have to be compared with the 
disadvantages of a tighter regulation. Several potential measures to mitigate market power are 
discussed in the literature. They show greatly varying degrees of regulatory interference. 
Among others, the literature discusses measures to increase the price elasticity of demand and 
to expand forward contract volumes, the implementation of price caps, the promotion of 
additional interconnector capacity, and the divestiture of generating companies.  
Further research could apply the model to other regions and conduct similar analyses. The 
results could be used to evaluate different market designs. Other possible directions cover the 
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measurement of efficiency losses of market power. However, this necessitates a model 
simulating strategic players’ bidding behavior. It is a challenge not yet truly mastered to 
implement at least the most important features of electricity markets in an empirical model of 
strategic behavior. 
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4 Modeling Dynamic Constraints in Electricity Markets and the Costs of 
Uncertain Wind Output 
4.1 Introduction 
Various engineering dispatch models show the implications of intertemporal linkages for the 
optimal operation of a power system. In market based environments these intertemporal 
linkages are reflected in the prices that deviate from the variable costs of the marginal unit. 
The costs of starting up are usually allocated to the high demand periods and at the same time 
prices at the low demand periods are reduced to reflect the benefit of avoided shut-down and 
subsequent start-up decisions. Furthermore, power plants require a minimum output. This 
part-load constraint creates additional shifts between periods. Finally, higher variable costs, 
incurred if power stations are operated below their optimal rating, are allocated to the locally 
lowest demand.  
For inflexible power stations like lignite, hard coal, and combined cycle gas turbines, the start 
of the station has to be decided several hours before delivering output. At the earlier time 
there is still uncertainty about the future demand, possible failures of power stations and 
predictions for wind-output. We represent the uncertainty using stochastic programming with 
recourse. In combination with the linearized unit commitment representation this is a new 
formulation. We then represent improved wind forecasts by aggregating different wind 
realizations into information sets. This allows us to quantify the value of improved wind 
forecasts in combination with a design that makes use of this information. 
The impact of inter-temporal constraints, start-up and part load costs have been frequently 
discussed. Schweppe et al. (1988) developed a Lagrangian formulation to calculate the impact 
of inter-temporal constraints on the market equilibrium and prices. Hogan and Ring (2003) 
discuss how to use extra payments above marginal generation costs to pay for the additional 
costs. Oren and Ross describe how generators can misspecify intertemporal constraints in the 
balancing market, in order to exercise market power (2003). Simulations by Kreuzberg 
(2001), Cumperayot (2004) and also those presented in chapter 3 of this dissertation indicate 
that the marginal value of electricity can differ significantly from the variable costs of the 
marginal unit producing electricity. We analyze the optimization problem to associate an 
economic interpretation with the various shadow prices that arise in the formulation of the 
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optimization problem. Bushnell (2003) discusses the impact of intertemporal constraints on 
price in the context of a hydro system with market power. The scarcity value (or shadow 
price) of water, and not the marginal costs of running the turbine in a given hour determine 
the dispatch and frequently set the marginal price.  
The unit commitment problem exhibits non-convexities due to the indivisibilities of power 
plants. To illustrate the effect assume peak demand of 50.5 GW has to be covered with 1 GW 
units. Then 51 units have to be started up. If demand were to be increased by 0.1 GW then no 
additional units have to be started up and hence the marginal demand would only pay the 
energy costs – and not be exposed to start up costs. From this perspective the question arises 
how start-up costs can be earned. Hogan and Ring (2003) suggest minimum uplift payments 
to dispatched units in addition to energy payments to allow them at least zero profits. O’Neil 
et al. (2005) discuss payment approaches to compensate individual generators for additional 
costs. They suggest a two stage approach with an MIP model in the first stage and the integer 
solution to that problem fed as constraints into a linear model in the second step. The linear 
model allows an interpretation of shadow prices. Alternatively we can imagine uncertainty 
about demand or supply. Returning to the previous example, imagine that anticipated demand 
is uniformly distributed between 50 GW and 51 GW. Then the additional demand of 0.1 GW 
has to carry the start-up cost of an additional 1 GW unit with 10% probability or in 
expectation has to pay 1/10th of the start up costs of a 1 GW unit. So if uncertainty about 
demand and supply balance exceeds the capacity of typical units at the margin then non-
convexities have limited impacts on pricing decisions.  
To quantify the effect of inter-temporal constraints on generation costs a dynamic linear 
optimization model is used to choose the power plant dispatch with minimal generation costs. 
The dynamic component is added through the simultaneous optimization of several 
consecutive load levels. The initial model is then expanded to a stochastic linear program with 
recourse (see Carpentier et al., 1996, Takriti et al., 2000). This enables the formalization of 
the uncertainty about demand, possible failure of some generation capacity or output from 
intermittent generation. Gröwe et al. (1995) used the same method to capture deviations of 
demand realization from dispatch, though ignoring unit commitment. Hobbs et al. (1999) use 
a unit commitment model to calculate the optimal dispatch for each of the possible 
realizations. Then they choose the dispatch, which performs best when tested against all of the 
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realizations. Their approach also allows for the use of observed errors with their intertemporal 
structure.  
We represent the uncertainty that remains several hours before dispatch; this is the time when 
inflexible generating units are started up. Linear programming with recourse selects a set of 
realizations of, and probabilities for, the parameters that are uncertain, treats this set as a 
deterministic set of future outcomes, and optimizes in order to minimize the expected cost 
function over all these realizations. The decision, according to which inflexible capacity is 
started up, stays fixed for all realizations of the demand and wind forecasting error, while 
output decisions of the started and of the flexible plants are allowed to differ between the 
realizations. We retain a fixed exogenously determined additional reserve quantity to 
compensate for power station and grid failures. This approach allows us to model the 
implications of uncertainty in wind predictions while retaining the linear and deterministic 
structure of the optimization problem.  
In a third step, we model the effect of reduced uncertainty on marginal costs. In a first set of 
simulations, we assume a gate closure at 2:30 p.m. on the day before delivery. At the time of 
gate closure, planned plant dispatch must be reported to the grid operator. All deviations from 
nominated schedules must be served using reserve and balancing power. Some power markets 
allow for changes on a shorter time scale - e.g. up to one hour before dispatch in the UK - but 
usually liquidity in these short-term markets is too low to allow for significant adjustments. In 
a second set of simulations, we calculate the value of dispatching the system using the 
reduced forecasting error closer to dispatch. Currently, the day-ahead market determines 
dispatch 24 hours before demand realization, and therefore can only use rather inaccurate 
predictions. However, most power plants can be started on a shorter time frame, e.g. four 
hours, and allow the usage of better demand and wind predictions. We group the stochastic 
deviations into equal-sized information sets (Laffont, 1984). The improved information 
available closer to dispatch is represented by additional information specifying which 
information set will describe the possible deviations.  
Based on the assumption that the impact of the individual units on dispatch costs is small in 
large markets we group units in different technologies. For every technology, the variable on 
start-ups is assumed to be continuous. So the model can for example start up any capacity 
between 0 and 21 GW of hard coal capacity available in the system. However, once the 
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decision to start-up x GW has been made, production is restricted by that limit (and minimum 
production has to fulfill the partial load restriction). From the perspective of interpretation this 
follow the example of NYISO, where a unit commitment program initially calculates the 
optimal dispatch but prices are calculated in a second run allowing for start-up decisions of 
fractions of units. Alternatively Madrigal and Quintana (1998) suggest using the prices from 
the Lagrange relaxation, thereby smearing the start-up costs over larger ranges of the marginal 
demand. From the numerical perspective we can refer to the good match of modeled prices 
with observed prices in the German market that Kreuzberg (2001) obtained using this 
approach. Allowing for continuous start up decisions avoids the computational complexities 
that result from solving mixed integer problems (MIPs). The challenges and other solution 
approaches are described in Wood and Wollemberg (1996) and Sen and Kothari (1998). The 
models have been solved, initially with dynamic programming, genetic algorithms, 
Lagrangian relaxation and, recently, with branch and bound algorithms (Makkonen and 
Lahdelma, 2005).  
Once the theoretical framework is established, we parameterize the model with realized data 
for the German market. We use the example of wind power generation to analyze the effects 
of uncertainty. We find that the costs of balancing wind power were relatively low in the 
German system in 2003. They could be reduced even further when a better forecast becomes 
available, either by implementing a later gate closure or by improvements in the wind 
forecasting model. We estimate that variable costs of conventional generation increase by 
approximately 1.4% if only 24 hour wind predictions are used to determine unit commitment. 
If improved wind forecasts are used and final dispatch is determined four hours before 
realization, then variable costs only increase by 0.6%.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Subchapter 4.2 introduces the formulation of the inter-
temporal constraints and analytic results on how they affect prices. Subchapter 4.3 adds 
uncertainty to the model using a deterministic linear equivalent of a stochastic optimization 
model with recourse. Subchapter 4.4 presents a model to quantify the savings brought about 
by reduced uncertainty. In Subchapter 4.5, this model is then parameterized with data for the 
German power market in the year 2003 and applied to calculate the benefits updating wind 
forecasts. Subchapter 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 The Economics of Intertemporal Dynamics 
We introduce three physical characteristics of power plants and the resulting intertemporal 
constraints. Analytic arguments are used to show how these constraints alter the marginal 
energy prices at different segments of the load curve.38  
4.2.1 Modeling of Intertemporal Constraints - Thermal System 
We calculate the optimal dispatch for the operation of an electricity system. To simplify the 
representation in this subchapter we only assume one technology and ignore uncertainty. We 
start with a model that only captures fuel and start-up costs. To ensure started capacity will 
subsequently be stopped, we include part-load constraints. In a second step, the model is 
expanded to also capture part-load costs.  
The system operator determines the output choice tX  to maximize the system benefits TC−  
over hours t  of the day, given variable operational costs of xc of unit and start up costs uc , 
which are incurred when capacity tU is started in period t . Maximize with respect to X , U , 
and :D  
(14) ( )T X Ut t
t 1
TC X c U c
=
− = − +∑ . 
The optimization is subject to the energy balance for each period (shadow price dtλ ):  
(15) t td X 0− =  t∀ .  
The sum of capacity started in the current and preceding periods minus the sum of stopped 
capacity tD  must equal or exceed current production (shadow price sutλ ): 
(16) ( )tt u u
u 1
X U D 0
=
− − ≤∑  t∀ .  
                                                 
38  A list of symbols is shown in appendix B. 
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Power stations have a minimum output quantity α  (with 0 1α≤ ≤ ), below which production 
is not possible or only with unacceptable efficiency losses. This is represented by the part-
load constraint (shadow price pltλ ): 
(17) ( )t u u t
u 1
U D X 0α
=
⋅ − − ≤∑   t∀ .  
The Lagrange function capturing these constraints is: 
(18) ( ) ( ) ( )T t tX U d su plt t t t t t t u u t u u t
t 1 u 1 u 1
L X c U c d X X U D U D Xλ λ λ α
= = =
   = − + + − + − − + − −       ∑ ∑ ∑ .  
4.2.2 Modeling of Intertemporal Constraints – Hydro-Storage 
The dispatch of hydro-storage capacity is another dynamic aspect optimized in our modeling 
approach. Hydro-storage plants are described by a capacity constraint restricting their 
maximal output at any time t  and an energy constraint (posed by the amount of water stored 
in the basin). While these hydro-storage plants have variable generating costs of nearly zero, 
the energy constraint limits the time for which they can be dispatched.. Hence, storage water 
production is dispatched during hours where it can reduce total generation costs the most. 
This is usually during peak demand periods. Dispatch decisions for hydro-storage facilities 
are by their very nature intertemporal, as the production of hydro-storage in one hour takes up 
energy that would otherwise be available for production in other hours. Pump storage plants 
can increase the available energy budget by pumping during low demand periods.39 
If hydro-storage is energy and not capacity constrained, then it flattens peaks. Therefore, the 
start-up costs that are usually allocated to one hour are distributed over multiple hours or 
peaks. Each hour then only receives a fraction of the start-up costs, and prices are less 
volatile. 
                                                 
39  Pump-storage plants consume electricity during low price periods to pump water from a lower basin up to a 
higher basin. Potential energy stored in the water in the higher basin can be used for electricity production 
during high price periods by letting it again flow into the lower basin. With an efficiency of above 75% 
(consume 4 MWh during low price periods to produce 3 MWh during the peak), this is a widely used way to 
store electricity in regions with the right landscape. 
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The complete set of equations describing the optimization problem, including hydro-storage 
and pump-storage dispatch constraints, is described in appendix B. Equations (36), (43) and 
(44) contain the endogenous optimization of storage and pump-storage facilities.40 
 
4.3 Modeling of Uncertainty  
It is often pointed out in the literature (e.g. E.ON wind report, 2005) that the stochastic pattern 
of wind power generation imposes additional costs due to an increase in the required amount 
of balancing power and a less favorable plant dispatch. To approximate the effects of 
uncertainty in our linear optimization model, we introduce a set ,...,r 1 R=  of possible 
realizations of forecasting error41. As we simultaneously model 24 hours of a day42, each of 
the forecasting error realizations is a vector with 24 values, one for each hour of the day. An 
efficient dispatch of the system must take into account the distribution of forecasting errors 
within each hour, and their dependence between-hours. The following example illustrates the 
relevance of intertemporal dependence of forecasting errors. The best response for a one-hour 
deviation between forecast and realized demand is to start a peaking plant with low start-up 
and high variable costs. In contrast, if the deviation is expected to remain over several hours, 
then it might be worthwhile to start a plant with higher start-up costs and lower variable costs.  
We restrict ourselves to calculating dispatch situations with typical time paths of forecasting 
errors using observed data for these errors. The data will be described in subchapter 4.5. 
                                                 
40  Optimizing ‘only’ 24 hours in our model, we make a simplification on inter-daily and long-run hydro 
dispatch decisions which we must treat as exogenous input. However, inter-seasonal hydro optimisation is 
not the focus of this article, as we concentrate on short-term dispatch decisions. In addition, we apply our 
methodology to the German market, which is somewhat influenced by hydro-storage facilities, but far less 
than other markets, e.g. Northern Europe. 
41  We use available data for the forecasting error realizations from ISET’s wind forecast for Germany in 2003. 
42  To avoid the impact of boundary conditions, we always simulate three consecutive days and then report the 
results for the middle day.  
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We assume that each error realization can occur, with probability rθ . The optimal system 
dispatch now involves maximizing the expected system benefit. This is represented by 
introducing the probability-weighted sum over all realizations. Furthermore, we introduced 
additional supply technologies by including the set ,...,s 1 S=  of different technologies. We 
avoid the problems of indivisibilities (a non-convexity) by grouping plants in similar supply 
technology groups43 and assuming infinitesimal unit size in each group. Maximize with 
respect to , ,X U  and :D   
(19) ( ) ( ), , , , , , , ,* * * *T S R tX PL U plr s t r s s s t r s s u r s u r s
t 1 s 1 r 1 u 1
TC X c c U c U D cθ
= = = =
− = − − + + −  ∑∑∑ ∑ . 
The demand equation in (20) must be satisfied for each realization of the forecasting error 
,t rρ . In addition, we reduce demand by the average expected wind generation etw .  
(20) , , , ,
S
e
t t r t r t s t r
s 1
d w P X 0ρ
=
− + + − =∑   
A power plant’s generation is restricted by its installed available capacity. However, a plant 
must be started up to be able to produce. As was formalized in equation (17), plants can 
change both production as well as start-up and shut-down decisions. However, since the 
deviations brought about by the forecasting error’s realization are, by their nature, unpredicted 
and arising on short notice, they must be covered by reserve and balancing capacity. This 
brings a crucial aspect of inflexibility into the model: some technologies do not have the 
flexibility to start up or shut down additional capacity on short notice. Therefore, these 
inflexible plants’ ( nfs ) amount of capacity started up and hence ready for operation must be 
identical for all possible realizations of the forecasting error. (21) shows these constraints.  
(21) , , ,s t r s tU U= ,  , , ,s t r s tD D=  , ,nfs s s t r∀ ≤ ∀   
Because of computational constraints, we can only model a limited number of system 
realizations. Extreme deviations, occurring with low probability, are not captured by the 
system realizations. We add an equation for additional reserve capacity to ensure that 
                                                 
43  Our specific setup for the German market will be discussed in subchapter 4.5. 
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sufficient flexible and spare operating capacity is available for these cases. We also subsume 
other sources of uncertainty, such as unforeseen plant outages and load deviations, in this 
equation. We capture this by introducing a capacity constraint for reserve and balancing 
power: 
(22) ( ), , , ,
nf
nf 1
s t S
m
t s u r s u r s
s 1 u 1 s s
d rc UP DN x 0
+= = =
+ − − − ≤∑∑ ∑  
 
4.4 Updating of Wind Forecasts 
The uncertainty of wind power generation can be reduced by improving the quality of wind 
forecasts. This can either be achieved by getting a better 24-hour-ahead forecast or by using a 
more up-to-date forecast when deciding on plants’ start-up and shut-down decisions. There is 
a limit to the second approach, as scheduling of inflexible plants requires sufficient lead-time. 
However, this lead-time of about four hours before production has not yet been achieved in 
most markets. In Germany, for example, plans for plant operation are decided and reported to 
the transmission grid operators at 2:30 p.m. the day before delivery, for all 24 hours of the 
delivery day. In theory, the British gate closure of one hour does undercut this lead-time; in 
practice, liquidity is too low in the intra-day market to allow for generators to reschedule 
efficiently. Postponing this notification, at least for wind power, to a later point in time would 
allow the use of a better wind forecast.44  
We will measure the effect of the reduced uncertainty in the wind forecast, either by a later 
gate closure or by more advanced prediction models, by using a four-hour-ahead forecast 
instead of the 24-hour-ahead forecast. However, we cannot simply calculate a model run with 
the four-hour-ahead wind forecast instead of the 24 hour wind forecast, because the effect on 
system costs of individual wind forecast errors is in the same order of magnitude as the effect 
                                                 
44  However, lead time is not only limited by thermal plants’ inflexibilities but also by the grid operators’ 
responsibility to maintain a secure network, which necessitates early enough knowledge of expected power 
flows.  
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of improving the wind forecasts. Therefore, choosing a different set of wind forecast errors 
would eliminate the opportunity to compare the results of both forecast scenarios.  
We therefore model this increase in information by dividing the original set for the 
forecasting error into different subsets. The number of possible forecasting error realizations 
is thus reduced in each model run. Thus, the increase in information gained by the four-hour-
ahead forecast is used to decide which subset of the original set of forecasting errors is 
reached. This leads to a reduction in costs, as plants can operate more flexibly. Instead of one 
mode of operation for all possible realizations, there is now a number of different modes of 
operation (one for each of the newly-created subsets). An additional aspect reducing costs 
when moving from the 24-hour-ahead forecast to the four-hour-ahead forecast is that the 
remaining uncertainty in the system is also reduced. This uncertainty might be caused partly 
by the possibility of highly unlikely wind conditions, but also by other factors of uncertainty, 
such as demand forecasting errors or plant outages. We treat those aspects by introducing an 
additional constraint representing the reserve capacity requirement (22). The resulting effect 
will be analyzed separately. The results can be compared to the day-ahead forecast by running 
separate scenarios for each information subset and averaging over these model runs.  
This clear-cut way of replacing day-ahead forecasts with four-hour forecasts gives us an upper 
bound to the system improvements. By the very nature of a ‘four-hour-ahead’ wind and 
demand forecast, only the next four hours are available. For the hours five to 24 hours ahead 
of dispatch, we cannot expect the same forecasting accuracy as we assume in our model.  
 
4.5 Application to German Power Sector 
We apply the model described above to the German power market. In 2003, our reference 
year, Germany was the country with the largest installed wind capacity: nearly 15 GW. The 
costs for the integration of wind power in the German system are currently the subject of 
lively debate (e.g. DENA, 2005), as plans for a further doubling of wind capacity until and 
beyond 2010 are being discussed. 
Chapter 3 presented a model for the entire European dispatch, at the expense of less detailed 
representation of intertemporal constraints, reserves and balancing requirements. This allows 
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for the endogenous determination of interconnector flows, which are used as exogenous input 
in our model due to lack of empirical data with sufficient resolution. The daily energy budgets 
for hydro-storage and pump-storage plants are also taken from that model. This simplification 
reduces price elasticity, as these parameters cannot adjust price signals in the model presented 
in this chapter.  
In the following representation, we define model demand as German demand net of CHP, run 
off river hydro, expected wind generation and international power exchange. Hourly wind 
forecasts and realizations are provided by ISET e.V. 
Generation plant data are taken from EWI’s plant data base, as data on efficiencies and 
installed capacities are hardly published anymore.45 We mentioned in subchapter 4.3 that we 
subsume supply technologies in different groups. To be more precise, we distinguish 16 
supply technology groups (nuclear, three lignite, four hard coal, two combined cycle gas 
turbine, three open cycle gas turbine, two oil-fired technologies and one storage technology). 
In addition, we assume a value of lost load (VOLL) of 1500 Euro/MWh, and the price for the 
option to call demand-side response is set at 150 Euro/MWh. This level is assumed to make it 
the most expensive technology and hence a ‘lender of last resort’. A VOLL of 1500 
Euro/MWh is significantly lower than the 2000 Pounds/MWh in the British Pool. 
Nonetheless, even 1500 Euro/MWh for the provision of balancing power is likely to 
overestimate the costs for balancing the system, given the low probability for the last MWs of 
the 7000 MW reserve capacity to be called. 
The perfect model of an electricity market would necessitate the simultaneous optimization of 
all 8760 hours of the year, but was impossible in our detailed model due to computational 
constraints. Therefore, we simultaneously optimize dispatch decisions for 24 hours of the day 
in each model run. To capture the effects of uncertainty, we allow R =12 forecasting error 
realizations per day. This gives a total of 12 24 288⋅ =  marginal cost results per model run. In 
addition, modeling a complete daily load cycle allows us to endogenously optimize start-up 
and shut-down decisions, as well as the variation of storage and pump-storage capacity over 
these 24 hours (e.g. pumping at night and producing at maximum capacity during the hours of 
                                                 
45  The last exhaustive publication, which is the foundation of the data base for Germany, was VDEW (2000).  
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highest demand). The resulting model has 65,000 equations and 45,000 variables and was 
solved on a 2 GHz desktop in about five minutes. 
Nonetheless, one day is obviously not representative of a whole year. Therefore, we solve the 
model for twelve different months per year. In each month, three different day types are 
analyzed: a working day, a Saturday and a Sunday. We differentiate between three different 
wind-scenarios in each month by sorting them for strong,  medium and  low wind output. The 
total number of independent scenarios we compute for one year, as summarized in Figure 15, 
is 12x3x3=108. Multiplied by the 288 marginal cost results per scenario, we calculate 31104 
different data points for the construction of a year. 
Obviously, there are some dynamic effects which exceed the 24 hour period of one day. Of 
particular concern is hydro-storage; most storage facilities are not optimized on a daily basis, 
but on a weekly or even seasonal basis. While we chose not to account for these effects 
endogenously in our model, we consider them exogenously by choosing appropriate energy 
budgets for hydro-storage to different months and days of the week.  
Figure 15: Total Number of Scenarios and Forecasting Error Realizations 
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4.5.1 Intertemporal Aspects 
Figure 16 shows results of the model in the absence of uncertainty about wind output. System 
marginal costs (SMC) represent the simulated price for each hour. The grey line ‘max vc’ 
shows the variable generating costs of the most expensive technology producing in any hour. 
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This line excludes the effects part-load and start-up costs have on the price. As predicted in 
the analytic model, the price curve is flatter with lower peak and higher off-peak prices. The 
analysis also illustrates the size of the errors that could result if a competitive benchmarking 
study were to compare observed prices with the variable costs of the most expensive unit on 
the system. Finally, in the curve ‘max vc merit’, the start-up and part load costs are not only 
ignored in the price formation but also for plant scheduling. With fewer constraints it is 
always possible to operate a unit with weakly lower variable costs. Hence, this line is 
bounded from above by ‘max vc’. 
Figure 16: Costs and Demand with Hydro Storage Dispatch,  
January (left) and July (right), Demand [GW] and Costs [Euro/MWh] 
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4.5.2 Uncertainty in the Wind Forecast 
We use wind data for 2003, provided by ISET in Germany. The data set contains hourly wind 
generation and the forecasts from four hours and 24 hours before dispatch. Generation and 
forecasting error in the data set are normalized on the installed capacity of 14521 MW at the 
end of the year. We include in the analysis of each month some days of the following month, 
so that the total number of days is 36. They are then divided in three groups of twelve days 
with strong, medium and low wind generation. For each day, we calculate the difference 
between 24 hour forecast and wind realization. This gives us, for each of the strong, medium 
and low wind scenarios, 12 realizations of prediction errors, which are taken as equally 
probable in the subsequent simulation. We take one additional step to make our data 
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comparable to other studies, by scaling the prediction errors with the factor 1.04, so that the 
standard deviation of the prediction error over the year is 7.29% of installed wind power 
capacity. Thus they are compatible with the DENA-Study (2005, p. 263). 
Figure 17 gives an example of the effects caused by uncertainty in the wind forecast. The 
demand range is determined by the maximal absolute deviations in the wind forecasting error, 
both upwards and downwards from the demand average. The grey-shaded SMC range is the 
range between minimal and maximal system marginal cost realizations. While SMC in most 
scenarios are grouped rather close to the average (‘SMC av’), the maximum is extremely high 
because it bears all the costs for the provision of reserve energy from equation (22). 
Comparing these results with marginal costs derived without uncertainty (included in Figure 
17 in the line ‘SMC const wind’), we find that the wind power’s uncertainty adds greatly to 
the volatility in SMC. However, the cost influence on the average is low. 
Figure 17: Uncertainty brought about by Wind Power, Medium Wind Scenario,  
January (left) and July (right), Demand [GW] and Costs [Euro/MWh]  
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The result, that the additional costs brought about by wind power’s uncertainty are low, is 
verified when we analyze the whole year instead of just two selected days. Figure 18 shows 
the changes in costs when the wind generation’s volatility is added to the model. We compare 
two model runs with identical average wind generation. Once, the wind generation is constant 
over all R=12 scenarios. In the alternative, the 12 forecasting errors represent the wind 
power’s volatility as described above. We find that both costs for part-load operation, as well 
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as start-up costs, increase significantly as the result of the increased volatility. This was to be 
expected, as start-up and shut-down decisions are the key variables used to balance wind 
power’s volatility. On the other hand, we find that the increase in generation costs is marginal. 
This is also plausible as average wind generation is held constant and only the volatility is 
changed. We find that the total cost increase as a result of wind volatility is rather low. We 
can understand this by looking at the right part of the graph, where we see that more than 98% 
of total costs are coming from generation costs, even in the model run with wind volatility. 
Therefore, the low increase in generation costs outweighs high relative increase in start-up 
and part-load costs, leading to a low overall increase in total costs.  
Figure 18: Annual Cost Increase due to Volatile Wind Power Generation by 
Component (left) and Cost Components’ Share of Total Costs (right) 
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4.5.3 Moving from 24-hour to Four-hour Wind Forecasts 
The costs arising from volatile wind power generation can be reduced even further when a 
better forecast is used. In subchapter 4.4, we gave a general description of the approach taken 
to include the additional information becoming available when moving from a 24-hour to a 
four-hour forecast. However, here we describe in greater detail how we applied this to our 
data set. We split the 12 forecasting error realizations into three independent scenarios, with 
only four realizations in each scenario (see Figure 15).  
The actual determination of which forecasting error belongs in which subgroup is determined 
by solving another optimization problem. This problem is non-linear with binary variables. 
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The objective function (23) shows that it sorts the twelve realizations into three groups, 
minimizing the total variance for all forecasting errors. The constraints ensure that  
− we end up with four realizations in each subgroup (24),  
− every realization is either totally in a subgroup or not at all (25), 
− and every realization appears in exactly one subgroup (26). 
(23) 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 2 2 21 2 3, , ,, , 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2
1 2 3
, , ,
1 1 1 1 1 1
min
1
4
T R T R T R
r t r r t r r t rV V V t r t r t r
T R T R T R
r t r r t r r t r
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= = = = = =
+ +
     − + +            
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s.t. 
(24) 1 2 3
1 1 1
4
R R R
r r r
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V V V
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= = =∑ ∑ ∑  
(25) 1 2 3 1i i iV V V+ + =  i r∀ ∈  
(26) { }0,1jiV ∈  { }, 1,2,3i R j∀ ∈ ∈  
Grouping the realizations lowers the standard deviation for the forecasting errors, reflecting 
the increase in information for the four-hour forecast. Using exactly the same realizations for 
the forecasting errors allows a maximum of comparison between our model runs for 24-hour 
and four-hour-ahead forecasts. However, we want to make sure that we achieve a most 
realistic improvement in the forecast’s accuracy. The DENA-study (2005, p. 263) names a 
variance of 4.92% of installed wind power generation capacity for the four-hour-ahead 
forecasting error. This value is again achieved by weighting the realizations in each group 
accordingly. 
Figure 19 shows again the increase of the different cost components when moving from the 
model run without wind volatility to the run with the wind volatility resulting from the day-
ahead forecast. In addition, the figure now also shows the increase in total costs when the 
lower volatility from the four-hour-ahead forecast is used. The graph shows that all costs 
increase by significantly less when the improved four-hour-ahead forecast is used, instead of 
the day-ahead forecast. Total cost increases by only 0.6% when the improved forecast’s 
volatility is added - instead of 1.4%, when the uncertainty from the day-ahead forecast is 
implemented. 
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Figure 19: Annual Cost Increase due to Uncertainty in Wind Generation – Day-
Ahead and Four-Hour-Ahead Forecast, Relative to Zero Volatility 
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4.6 Conclusion 
We developed a linear optimization model to analyze electricity markets. We stayed with the 
linear framework, as it has many advantages for the modeling of electricity markets. Firstly, 
linear models find unambiguous global optimums. Secondly, they are much less burdensome 
on computational resources. We can therefore include many aspects relevant to the modeling 
of electricity markets and use the extensive amount of data that is available for these markets 
while still keeping the model ‘tractable’.46 However, while following the established 
philosophy of a linear dispatch model, we extended this framework in several important 
directions, to model as closely as possible many features of electricity markets.  
Our dynamic representation of the problem is able to represent the effects of start-up costs and 
part-load operation by optimizing a whole day consisting of 24 different hourly load levels 
simultaneously. Improving on previous models, our setup is truly sequential. The dynamic 
                                                 
46  Tractable, in this context, means that we are able to run the model on a regular PC. Written in GAMS, it is 
able to exchange data with Excel spreadsheets. Solving one model run with the CPLEX solver takes about 10 
minutes on a high-end PC. Given that one year consists of 12 months ⋅  3 types of day per months ⋅  3 wind 
scenarios in each day ⋅  3 different groups of error realisations in the four-hour forecast, total computing time 
for these 324 model runs is more than one day.  
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modeling approach also enables us to endogenously optimize the dispatch of storage and 
pump-storage plants. We formalized this approach’s effects on system marginal costs in 
subchapter 4.2.  
However, we did not only implement a linear representation for the dynamic aspects of the 
problem, but also for uncertainty. The approach, which we chose to model uncertainty, can be 
referred to as stochastic programming with recourse. Some variables (in our context, start-up 
and shut-down decisions for inflexible plants) must be chosen before nature reveals the state 
of the world. However, some other variables, such as production, can be optimized after the 
state of the world is revealed. We illustrate this approach using wind power - a major source 
of uncertainty in electricity markets.  
However, as the uncertainty in the wind power forecast can be reduced by either a more 
accurate weather forecast or a shorter time-distance between forecast and realization, we also 
implement the change which an increase in information would bring. We implement this 
using Tirole’s concept of information sets, splitting the forecasting errors’ possible 
realizations into groups and optimizing these groups separately. 
In the last subchapter of this chapter, we calibrated the model developed in this article with 
empirical data for the German electricity market in the year 2003. We showed that following 
our dynamic approach, we get much more realistic marginal cost curves than with a simple 
static approach. System marginal costs change, especially during the very highest and lowest 
demand periods. However, the effects of hydro-storage capacity can counter this effect. If 
there is enough hydro-capacity and energy, the production profile for thermal capacity can be 
so flat that hardly any start-ups of thermal capacity are necessary, thus bringing down the 
peak and distributing start-up costs over a longer period of time.  
Furthermore, we use our very detailed model to quantify the effects of wind power on reserve 
and balancing provision. This is one important aspect in discussions of the costs and benefits 
of introducing a large share of wind power into an electricity system. We showed that costs 
for electricity generation are increased due to wind power’s volatility. However, this increase 
can be greatly reduced if the wind forecast can be made more accurate. The increase mostly 
comes from increased start-up and part-load costs. Generation costs are hardly influenced. 
This is in accordance with expectations, as volatility does not influence the average of the 
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demand realizations. However, as generation costs are by far the largest cost component, the 
total cost increase in the electricity system from wind volatility is found to be small (1.4%). 
This figure is reduced to 0.6% when the four-hour-ahead forecast is used. Interpreting these 
figures, one has to bear in mind that we are looking at data from 2003, when Germany was 
well endowed with generation capacity.47 The costs of increased wind power volatility can 
rise significantly when the system is closer to capacity limits. On the other hand, installed 
capacities can adapt in the long run to achieve an optimal integration of wind power into the 
system, e.g. by capacity additions in less capital-intensive flexible gas-turbines. Such long-
term effects are left for further research, as we concentrated on short-term dispatch in this 
chapter. 
In further research, the model could be extended to capture the effects of a continuous 
updating of the wind forecast, taking into account that additional data on the wind forecast are 
becoming available in every hour. This way, a decline in forecasting accuracy for those hours 
further ahead in the future than four hours can be modeled. In addition, the model can be 
extended to cover more than one model region and endogenously determine international 
power exchange. In addition, the model is directly applicable to many other empirical 
questions, such as the effect of CO2emission costs on plant dispatch and costs or competitive 
benchmarking studies. 
                                                 
47  The German market contained significant excess capacity before market liberalisation in 1998. While these 
capacities were reduced after liberalisation, this process was not finished before 2003. 
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5 Start-Up Costs in Electricity Markets 
5.1 Introduction 
Energy markets have been liberalized in a world wide movement towards deregulation. 
However, this unambiguous movement came to an end as some liberalized markets, e.g. in 
California, turned out to be significantly flawed. Against this background the question of how 
much regulation is needed in energy markets is of central importance. For this assessment, the 
disadvantages of regulated markets have to be compared to the disadvantages of liberalized 
markets. The vulnerability of wholesale electricity markets to different forms of gaming 
turned out to be a key disadvantage in liberalized markets. Due to the good availability of 
data, market power in electricity markets can be measured. This is done applying competitive 
benchmarking approaches comparing competitive estimates of the market results either with 
observed market price data or with the result of strategic models. In this chapter, we will 
analyze the importance of start-up costs as a factor which was neglected in previous studies 
but is nonetheless significantly influencing the structure of a competitive price benchmark. 
Numerous studies have analyzed market power in liberalized electricity generation markets 
(e.g. Green and Newbery 1992, Borenstein, Bushnell, and Wolak 2002). To our knowledge, 
all of these papers measure market power in static models neglecting dynamic intertemporal 
effects. Bushnell (2003) applies a dynamic model of strategic behavior in electricity 
generation markets focusing on the combined optimization of hydro storage and thermal 
units. However, even that model does not consider the effects of start-up costs. The neglect of 
start-up costs in many of these papers is due to the complexity start-up costs add to the 
problem. For example, it is hard to determine supply function equilibria even in static 
electricity markets and seems virtually impossible in the context of the simultaneous 
intertemporal analysis necessary to capture start-up costs. Nonetheless, the effects of start-up 
costs are recognized in these papers. Green and Newbery (1992) state that start-up costs can 
lead to significant price increases especially during periods of highest demand. This effect, 
however, is easily confused with price increases resulting from strategic behavior which is 
also most pronounced during high demand periods. This is problematic as the first is an 
efficient scarcity signal, the second the result of market power. Borenstein, Bushnell and 
Wolak (2002) also mention start-up costs as a neglected factor in their analysis and even raise 
the question in which periods start-up costs should optimally be included in power plants’ 
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supply bids. They also recognize that start-up costs increase prices during high demand 
periods and decrease prices during low demand periods. The same result was discussed by 
Lucas and Taylor (1994) in the context of an analysis of the market design in the England and 
Wales electricity pool. They were even more specific stating that only start-ups at (local) 
maxima in demand increase start-up costs as load increases during other periods simply lead 
to earlier start-ups (or later shut-downs) of capacity. We show that the increase of prices 
during peak periods due to start-up costs and the decrease during low demand periods nearly 
cancel out on the average.  
Start-up costs and hydro storage and pump storage dispatch are intertemporal effects 
influencing the structure of prices. Start-up costs are the costs associated with the start of 
operation for a power plant. These costs comprise the costs to heat up the boiler, costs for 
synchronization of the plant with the electricity grid, and also increased attrition as the result 
of the high changes in the temperature due to heating up a plant. Start-up costs are 
independent of the time of production following the start-up. Hence, the determination of the 
optimal dispatch is not a static problem as the optimal mode of operation in any hour depends 
on the hours before and after. The other dynamic component, hydro storage dispatch, is not in 
the focus of this chapter. See Scott and Read (1996) for a description of an optimal hydro 
storage dispatch and chapter 3 for a quantification of hydro storage’s impact on prices. 
Start-up costs emerge from the special features of electricity markets which distinguish them 
from many other markets. Electricity cannot be stored economically. In connection with a 
demand profile that exhibits strong seasonalities over the course of the day, week, and year, 
this leads to large fluctuations in demand. Since the different generation plants have varying 
productions costs, fluctuations in demand lead to fluctuations in electricity prices (Figure 20). 
This in turn translates directly into changing modes of operations for many plants. While it is 
often economical to operate a plant with high variable costs during high price (and demand) 
periods over the day, the same plant might shut down at night when prices are low.  
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Figure 20: Seasonality and Volatility in Electricity Prices, an Example from the 
German Power Exchange 
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Source: Müsgens and Ockenfels (2006) 
The problem of determining an efficient plant dispatch (production schedule) in the face of 
variable generation costs and start-up costs facing the features described above is a unit 
commitment problem. Such unit commitment problems are often analyzed in the context of 
mixed integer (MIP) models (e.g. Bard 1988). While this approach is the most exact for the 
problem at hand, it has some disadvantages. One is the interpretation of the dual variables in 
mixed integer problems. Both O’Neill et al. (2005) and Hogan and Ring (2003) describe this 
problem in great detail. They also present a solution which is first solving the MIP problem 
and then feeding the solution to the integer variables as constraints into a linear model. We 
chose a simpler approach by directly analyzing a linear model. This linear model neglects the 
effects of non-convexities caused by indivisibilities. However, it enables a more detailed 
analysis of other factors. We discuss in chapter 4 that this can be a reasonable simplification 
in large systems. Furthermore, both Figure 21 and, to much greater detail, chapter 3 show that 
the linear approach seems to be a reasonable simplification for the German market as model 
results are rather close to market data.  
Hence, we know that start-up costs play a role in electricity markets. They influence both 
efficient dispatch and prices. Against this background, they should be entailed in electricity 
market models. However, the question remains how big an error is made neglecting their 
impact. This chapter was motivated by empirical results in our research suggesting that start-
up costs are indeed an important aspect for the explanation and modeling of electricity prices. 
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This result is presented in Figure 21. The figure presents price duration curves for the year 
2001 in the German market. Price duration curves are price curves sorted in descending order. 
The ‘Price’-curve shows the observed market price from the German power exchange 
(volume weighted averages of the two power exchanges operating in the German market in 
2001). The curve is based on 8760 hourly price realizations for the year. The ‘price av’-curve 
is defined by 
1
1( ) ( )h
t
priceav h price th == ∑ , where h  and t  are the hours on the abscissa. 
The two other curves are derived with the linear optimization model described in chapter 4. 
The ‘base’-curve is a model run endogenously optimizing start-up decisions and both hydro 
storage and thermal production taking into account uncertainty and reserve and balancing 
requirements. The ‘no suc’-curve is the same as the base case with the exception of start-up 
costs which are set to zero. Both model graphs are calculated from 2592 data points. They are 
based on the dual variables of the demand restriction (later referred to as 0λ ). These marginal 
costs should be the price in an efficient competitive market. 
Figure 21: Start-Up Costs’ Impact on the Marginal Costs an Example from the 
German Power Market in 2001 
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 Source: EEX, own calculations 
The graph highlights the importance of start-up costs for the structure of electricity prices. 
Neglecting them leads to too low prices in the high price areas in the left part of the graph and 
too high prices during low price periods in the right part of the graph. This obvious result is 
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supported by the explanatory power. A regression using ( )base t  as the only explanatory 
variable for ( )price t  gives 2 0.49R = . Using ( )no suc t , the explanatory power drops to 
2 0.27R =  supporting the view that start-up costs indeed are important for the price structure. 
While the relatively high explanatory power is in part the result of sorting the price duration 
curve, we showed in chapter 3 that similar models can yield good results when 24 hours for 
typical days per month are analyzed. 
However, we also see in the figure that the annual average (the very right data points in the 
three ‘… av’-curves) is very close together for all three curves. This observation, which was 
also made by Kreuzberg (2001) and Cumperayot (2004), suggests that the cost increasing 
effect of start-up costs during high demand periods and the cost decreasing effect during low 
demand periods nearly cancel out. 
In this chapter, we take these empirical results as motivation to perform a rigorous theoretical 
analysis of the effect of start-up costs in a linear optimization model. We present a simplified 
model capturing many effects of start-up costs. In the context of this model, we derive several 
theorems on the properties of the optimal solution. One key result is that the sum of marginal 
costs depends only on the costs of the technology with lowest total generation costs for flat 
generation over all periods. In fact, if demand is different over all periods, we even show that 
the minimum cost technology’s total generation costs, defined as start-up costs of that 
technology plus the total number of demand periods times variable costs, equal the sum of the 
dual variables or shadow prices of the demand restriction which in turn equal the market price 
in a competitive environment. In the limit, this means that average marginal costs are equal to 
the variable costs of the cheapest technology – independently of start-up costs. One 
implication of this result is that the structure of load does not influence average marginal 
costs. It is important to note at this point that we are analyzing time weighted average 
marginal costs. Volume weighted, average marginal costs are increased as we already pointed 
out that start-up costs increase prices during high demand periods but lower them during low 
demand periods. However, the time weighted average is relevant for many aspects, e.g. 
investment decisions both on the supply and demand side. In addition, the base price (price 
for the delivery of 1 megawatt of electricity over a certain time interval, or time weighted 
average) is an important reference point for the market. 
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Furthermore, we develop an algorithm to determine the optimal solution to our problem. This 
algorithm determines both optimal dispatch as well as the dual variables to the primal 
problem without having to solve an optimization problem. As a result of this algorithm, we 
can show that in the absence of binding capacity limits, all technologies fulfill the zero profit 
condition. 
We leave the analysis how these results change in the context of more detailed models for 
further research. However, we believe that at least partial load and hydro storage dispatch can 
be included in an extended version.  
The chapter is structured as follows. Subchapter 5.2 presents the model used to derive our 
results. Subchapter 5.3 presents the results, subchapter 5.4 concludes the chapter. Appendix C 
in subchapter 7.3 contains both the proofs to the theorems and numerical examples to allow 
an easier access to the subject.  
 
5.2 Model 
We apply a linear optimization model to determine the cost minimizing power plant dispatch. 
The objective function is the minimization of total costs (TC ) in (27): 
(27) Minimize with respect to ijx , ijx+ , and ijx− : ( )n s ij i ij i
j 1 i 1
TC x vc x sc+
= =
= ⋅ + ⋅∑∑ . 
The model distinguishes three different groups of variables. ijx  is the production of 
technology i in period j, ijx+  is the amount of capacity newly started and ijx−  the amount shut 
down, ,i j∈` . Note that ijx−  does not appear in the objective function as the shut down of 
capacity does not inflict any costs. Costs inflicted by producing a unit of ijx  are ivc  (variable 
generation costs) and by starting up one unit isc . 
Total costs are minimized subject to the following constraints: 
(28) 
s
j ij
i 1
d x 0
=
− =∑
 , ,j 1 n∀ = … , 
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(29) 
( )jij ik ik
k 1
x x x 0+ −
=
− − ≤∑
 , , , ,i 1 sand j 1 n∀ = =… … , 
(30) 
( )ji ik ik ij
k 1
x x x 0α + −
=
⋅ − − ≤ ∑  , , , ,i 1 sand j 1 n∀ = =… … , 
(31) 
( )j ik ik i
k 1
x x x 0+ −
=
− − ≤∑
 , , , ,i 1 sand j 1 n∀ = =… … . 
Constraint (28) states that aggregated production equals demand d  in each period. (29) 
assures that only capacity previously started can produce and (30) is a partial load constraint 
guaranteeing that at least a share sα  of previously started capacity is used for production. This 
partial load constraint it due to technical limitations on the operation of power plants. 
Constraint (31) states that total capacity started up and ready to produce cannot exceed the 
installed available capacity ix .  
However, for the analysis in this chapter, we assume that there is so much capacity that (31) is 
never binding. Furthermore, we set i 1 iα = ∀  which means abstracting from partial load 
operation. In that case, inequalities (29) and (30) simplify to one equation: 
(32) 
( )jij ik ik
k 1
x x x 0+ −
=
− − =∑
 ,s n∀ . 
We formulated that problem in standard OR notation as a maximization problem. Then, we 
face the following primal problem: 
(PP) 
max ,
. .
0
c x
s t
Ax d
x
=
≥
 , 
where 
3
11 1 1 11 11 1 1 1( ,..., ,..., ,..., , , ,..., , ,..., ,..., )
s n
n s s n n n s s nx x x x x x x x x x x
+ − + − + − ⋅ ⋅′= ∈ℜ , 
3
1 1 1 1( ,..., ,..., ,..., , ,0,..., ,0,..., ,0,..., ,0)
s n
s s s sc vc vc vc vc sc sc sc sc
⋅ ⋅′= − − − − − − − − ∈ℜ , 
( 1)
1( ,..., ,0,...,0)
s n
nd d d
+ + ⋅′= ∈ℜ , and 
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nId  is the identity matrix with dimension n . 
Transforming (PP) into its dual program (see Schrijver (1998) for dualization procedure) and 
slightly rearranging gives the following program: 
(DP): 
0
0
min ,
1 1,...,
0 1 1,...,
i i n
i i n
d
vc i s
A sc i s
λ
λ λ
λ
≥ − − ⋅ ∀ =
≤ ≤ ⋅ ∀ =
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1 1 ... 1
0 1
... ...
0 1
A
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, 1( ,..., )
T
nd d d= , 1( ,..., ) , 0,...,Ti i i n i sλ λ λ= ∀ = , and N1 (1,....,1)Tn
n
= . 
For the rearrangement we use that 
2
( ,0,..., ,0)T Ti i i
n
B sc scλ ≥ − −	
  for 1,...,i n=  if and only if 
0 1 1,...,i i nA sc i sλ≤ ≤ ⋅ ∀ = . 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Time-Dependent Generation Costs and Dominated Technologies 
Based on lemma 1 which we present in appendix C, we can proof the following theorem: 
Theorem 1: 
(DP) is equivalent to the following linear program: 
(DP*) 0
0 1
max ,
1 ,for 1,...,j j n j
d
A j n
λ
λ γ − +
− < >
≤ =

 , 
where 00
~ λλ −= , 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
... ...
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
jA
    =     
" "
" "
 and 
{ }iisij vcjsc ⋅+= = ,...,1minγ .  
Thus, jγ  is the cost minimum over all technologies for serving a flat demand of one unit for 
j  hours. These costs are the sum of start-up costs and j-times variable generation costs. The 
optimal solution to (DP*) is only restricted by jγ . Hence, other things, for example the total 
number of different generation technologies, do not enter the problem. In addition, if a 
technology k  is dominated by another technology i  (e.g. i i k ksc j vc sc j vc j n+ ⋅ ≤ + ⋅ ∀ ≤ ), 
the dominated technology is never used for production and can be removed from the problem 
without changing the optimal solution. This follows because dominated technologies do not 
appear in the jγ . However, this is only true when there is sufficient capacity of the 
dominating technologies available.  
Figure 22 shows time-dependent generation costs for four different generation technologies. 
The intercept in both graphs represents start-up costs, the slope represents variable costs of the 
different generation technologies. In both cases, the solid line represents the cost minimal 
generation choice for a certain length. Discretized for each full hours, this step-wise linear 
function determines jγ . In the left graph, nuclear power is the cheapest generation technology 
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even for rather short periods of production. Hard coal (HC) and combined cycle gas 
turbines (CCGT) are strictly dominated and would never produce. Hence, they could be taken 
out of the optimization problem.  
However, nuclear capacity is limited. For this reason, nuclear capacity produces with 
maximum capacity whenever demand is higher than the installed capacity. Otherwise, all load 
is served by nuclear capacity. While capacity limitations are not directly implemented in our 
model, such a generation profile can be easily transformed into our formulation by simply 
reducing demand by the nuclear technology’s generation. The residual demand has then to be 
covered by the technologies in the right part of the figure. Hence, the generation costs found 
in the right figure is likely to be the relevant setting for the determination of marginal costs. 
Figure 22: Time-Dependent Generation Costs per MW of Capacity Started, 
No Binding Nuclear Capacity Limit (Left), Binding Limit (Right) 
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5.3.2 Algorithm to Determine the Optimal Plant Dispatch 
Firstly, we define ija  such that ( )1 1, , :T Tj n j j ja a A− + =…  1, ,j n∀ = …  and N0 0,...,0
T
i
n
a
=  
. 
Secondly, we construct a modified primal problem (PP*) which is the dual problem of (DP*): 
(PP*) 
1
1 1
min
n jn
ij j
j i
x γ
− +
= =
− ⋅∑ ∑    
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s.t. 
1
1 1
n jn
ij ij
j i
x a d
− +
= =
⋅ =∑ ∑   and 0ijx ≥  for 1,...,1;,...,1 +−== jninj . 
The ijx  in (PP*) have a straight forward interpretation. ijx  is the amount of capacity that starts 
producing in hour i  and produces for the next consecutive j  hours. Based on this modified 
primal problem, we developed the following algorithm to identify the optimal production.  
Theorem 2: 
Suppose 0≥d . An optimal solution * * * * *1 11 2 1 1( ,..., , ,..., )n n nx x x x x−=      to PP* can be calculated 
through the following iterative procedure where ( ), , , , , 1, , 1i j k l s j i n i+∈ = − +` … : 
*
1nx = knk d,...,1min=  
{ } { }{ }
* *
,..., 1
( , )
( , 1,..., 1 , 1,..., 1 )
1
min ( )ij k slk i i j
s l
s i l n s s i l j n i
s l k
x d x= + − ∈
< = − + ∪ = = + − +
∩ + ≥ +
= − ∑    
The algorithm determines an unambiguous solution for the dispatch problem by determining 
how much capacity is producing at any point in time. The algorithm’s key advantage is its 
simplicity. In particular, it does not require any optimization software. Furthermore, the 
algorithm can be used to identify marginal costs *0iλ . 
5.3.3 Average Electricity Price and Marginal Costs 
Corollary 1:  
If 0nd n> ∀  it follows from *1 0nx >  and the complementarity condition that 
(33) *0
1
n
i n
i
λ γ
=
=∑  . 
Furthermore, if the length n of the cycle is sufficiently large, then the start-up costs are not 
important at all and  
(34) 
{ }*0 1,...,1
1lim min
n
i in i si
vc
n
λ→∞ ==
 ⋅ = − ∑ . 
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As *0 iλ  is the shadow price of the demand restriction in period i, it is also the price estimator. 
Hence, (34) states that any start-up decisions during the period of observation do 
asymptotically not influence the average price over all periods. The average price (called 
‘base price’ in electricity markets) is only influenced by variable costs of the generation 
technology with lowest marginal costs and this technology’s start-up costs. In particular, the 
average price is neither influenced by the demand structure (very peaky or rather flat, number 
of peaks, …) nor by the cost parameters of any of the other technologies (e.g. peaking units). 
Furthermore, we have the hypothesis that (34) remains valid even if partial load operation is 
allowed.  
In addition, the results of theorem 2 can also be used to determine the hourly marginal costs in 
addition to the average.  
0
1
*
00
n
i n
i
ij ij jx a
λ γ
λ γ
=
=
> ⇒ ⋅ =
∑

 (this again follows from the complementarity condition). 
When i jd d i j≠ ∀ ≠ , the solution to the problem is unambiguous. In that case, we have n  
independent equations determining n  0 iλ . If we have several different equal load levels, the 
solution is not unambiguous but still restricted by the sum of several 0 iλ .  
5.3.4 Zero Profit Condition 
Corollary 2:  
In the optimum, every technology fulfills the zero profit condition.  
The proof for this corollary can be found in appendix C. It is noteworthy that this corollary 
crucially depends on the assumption that no capacity constraint exists for the technologies. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Start-up cost are a cost component which should be contained in electricity price and cost 
estimates. However, especially models of strategic behavior have a different focus and too 
much complexity to endogenously model start-up costs. Hence, the question of how big an 
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error is being made when start-up costs are neglected in an analysis is very important. While 
many publications qualitatively debate their impact, all but a few do not quantify them. Some 
empirical model results (e.g. Figure 21) are available but analytical results were lacking. This 
is the first chapter deriving analytical results for a linear optimization model of start-up costs 
in electricity markets.  
We have shown that the average marginal costs in wholesale electricity markets are hardly 
influenced by start up costs. In a competitive market, these marginal costs, which are the dual 
variable of the demand restriction in the primal problem, also set the price. When the length 
of the observation period gets very long, the average price is purely determined by the lowest 
variable generation costs of all technologies. This result is independent of the height of any 
generation technology’s start-up costs. As a result, market power estimates calculated with 
rather simple static models can be used without further analysis of start-up costs as long as 
average prices over a long period of observation are analyzed. However, the structure of 
prices is significantly shifted by start-up costs. Hence, as soon as only parts of a period (e.g. 
peak periods) are analyzed, start-up costs should play a central role in any analysis.  
These results mean that the structure of demand is irrelevant for the average price. Hence, it is 
not true that an “unfavorable” load profile, e.g. as the result of strong seasonality in electricity 
generation from wind power, leads to higher average marginal costs.  
Furthermore, we present a computationally simple algorithm to determine both the efficient 
dispatch and marginal costs in the case without partial load operation and binding capacity 
constraints. This algorithm was necessary to derive our results on start-up costs’ impact. 
However, if this algorithm can be extended to cope with a more advanced set of equations 
incorporating some of the simplifications mentioned below, it has the potential to be used as a 
heuristic for dispatch decisions. 
One has to bear in mind that our results are derived assuming some simplifications in the 
market. However, we believe that some of these simplifications could be included in our 
modeling approach. Firstly, we simplified the unit commitment problem from a mixed integer 
into a linear programming problem. We discuss in chapter 4 that this can be a reasonable 
simplification in large systems, especially with uncertainty and in the limit. Secondly, we 
abstract from partial load operation. We believe, as mentioned before, that the asymptotical 
behavior of the average marginal costs is still valid in the presence of partial load. A third 
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simplification is the abstraction from binding capacity limitations. For some technologies, e.g. 
nuclear power, this simplification can be easily circumvented by simply subtracting available 
nuclear generation capacity from demand during all periods. The resulting demand can then 
be served by the algorithm presented. It remains the topic of further research how big the 
implications of this assumption are in empirical analyses. The zero profit condition does not 
hold anymore if capacity constraints are binding for some technologies. The constrained 
technologies earn positive profits.  
The intertemporal constraint of hydro storage was also not implemented in the model 
analytically analyzed in this chapter. Furthermore, we focused on short term dispatch 
decisions for existing power plants in the electricity market. We did not analyze long term 
investment decisions. These will in particular change the result that the amount of variations 
in the demand curve does not change the average price as investments will also change in the 
long run. Last but not least, we analyzed a deterministic model. 
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6 Conclusion 
This dissertation analyzes the economics of wholesale electricity markets. Chapter 2 
discussed the development of the German wholesale market since its liberalization in 1998 
and contrasted the wholesale price development with the development of the other final 
consumer price components (transmission, distribution, taxes, and subsidies…) to put the 
wholesale market into perspective. Chapters 3 and 4 presented models to capture the complex 
structure of the market. Both chapters contained empirical applications of these models to the 
German market. Chapter 3 presented the first competitive benchmarking study for Germany. 
The model results validated the quality of the model in a first period with only minor 
differences between market prices and benchmark, but also found market prices significantly 
above the benchmark in a second period. The difference could be attributed partly to market 
power. Chapter 4 focused on the increase in uncertainty brought about by an ever-increasing 
volatile wind generation. The costs for this uncertainty seem relatively low in the short run. 
Chapter 5 completed the analysis by proving that the effect of start-up costs on average prices 
is very small.  
The results from the competitive benchmarking study in chapter 3 imply that the exercise of 
market power has increased over time. However, the competitive benchmarking analysis does 
not analyze individual companies’ bidding behavior. Hence, it is not apparent which market 
participants are behaving strategically. It is even possible that strategic withholding in other 
countries is responsible for the rise of prices above the competitive benchmark in Germany. 
Furthermore, it remains to quantify the loss of efficiency brought about by this strategic 
behavior. From an economic point of view, the loss of efficiency is the crucial disadvantage 
of strategic behavior in electricity markets. It is caused by an undersupply of electricity due to 
demand reactions to higher prices. The loss is probably low, as short-term demand is rather 
inelastic. However, market power on electricity markets leads to additional inefficiencies: 
firstly, withheld capacity is replaced by capacity with higher costs, which leads to a sub-
optimal dispatch; secondly, prices raised by market power during some periods can trigger 
sub-optimal investments. These assessments are left for further research. They necessitate an 
explicit modeling of strategic behavior. However, such models are static because the 
determination of profit-maximizing strategies and game-theoretic equilibria is already rather 
complex. The coupling of the two approaches seems a promising avenue for further research. 
In a first step, profit-maximizing strategies could be determined with a game-theoretic model. 
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In a second step, the dynamic models presented in this dissertation could be applied to 
calculate more realistic price estimates for these withholding strategies. 
The results from chapter 4 imply that the German system had enough spare capacity during 
our period of observation to buffer the wind power’s volatility at relatively low costs. We 
endogenously model the wind power’s forecasting error, which is balanced with reserve and 
balancing generation. The costs for the remaining uncertainty, e.g. from unplanned plant 
outages, are approximated by the constant provision of additional reserve capacity. This 
should be integrated into future work. In addition, the calculation of necessary reserve and 
balancing capacity should vary over time. For example, during times of low wind forecasts 
less upwards reserve capacity is needed because the wind realization cannot be much lower 
than the forecast. 
Both chapters 3 and 4 present dynamic linear optimization models. They incorporate the 
effects of start-up costs and hydro (pump) storage dispatch. The linearization is a 
simplification in some respects, however. In reality, power plants have discrete unit sizes. 
This implies that a mixed integer (MIP) formulation is most realistic (where units can be 
modeled as either being ‘on’ or ‘off’). The disadvantage of the MIP formulation is that no 
start-up costs can be attributed to the dual variables of the demand restriction because a 
marginal load increase leads to additional units being started up with zero probability. This 
problem does not appear in our linear framework. Furthermore, the linear system is much 
easier to solve. Empirical results in this dissertation and also by Kreuzberg (2001) show that 
our linear model closely tracks the real market. Nonetheless, further research quantifying the 
differences between MIP and linear models is needed.  
Chapter 5 proved our empirical observation that start-up costs are very important for the 
structure of prices but not for the average price. The direction for further research is rather 
obvious, as the proof presented in this dissertation is valid for a simplified model version. 
Partial load operation and hydro (pump) storage dispatch, in particular, should be included in 
an extended study.   
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7 Appendix  
7.1 Appendix A (to chapter 3) 
The quality of input data is absolutely crucial for the determination of marginal costs in 
electricity markets. The liberalization had two opposed effects on the amount of data 
published. Increased competition and the increased value of information have made 
generators much more reluctant to provide data to the public. On the other hand, regulators 
and grid companies are working in the opposite direction, increasing the data published in 
some countries. While most data are available at a monthly resolution, there is very little data 
available on an hourly basis. It should be mentioned that additional data simplify research, but 
in a strategic context they can make collusion more stable. The reason is that a player’s 
deviations from collusive strategies are more easily detected by competitors and a threat of 
punishment is hence more credible.  
Besides inaccurateness in the data and simplifications in the model, the most important results 
in this chapter, namely the strong increase in market power over time, seem robust. This is 
especially true since we made an effort to use a consistent data set in this analysis. The same 
data sources were used over the whole period of observation.48 Nonetheless, a more detailed 
description of the data can make the analysis less abstract and support the understanding of 
the derivation of marginal cost estimators. 
The presentation of all data used in the analysis would be too extensive. For that reason, 
monthly data for the year 2001 are described as an example. The year 2001 seems 
representative since it covers periods where the market seems competitive as well as other 
periods with large differences between prices and competitive benchmark.  
Plant efficiencies and installed capacities for the different vintage classes are taken from the 
Institute of Energy Economics’ plant database. The database comprises installed electrical and 
heat generating capacity, type of fuel, efficiencies and the year of construction for units in all 
model regions. It is updated in a tedious process collecting all available information. In 
                                                 
48  The exception is some data for 2003: for example nuclear availabilities and hydro generation figures had to 
be taken from UCTE since some national statistics were not yet available at the time. 
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Germany, the database contains about 1700 units based on a publication (VDEW 2000) which 
covers most German plants in the year 1998. Following market liberalization, this publication 
is another example for the increasing value of information in the market – as it is not updated 
anymore because plant operators are unwilling to provide necessary data. 
However, not all installed capacity is available for production and balancing services. Plants 
may be offline due to stochastic outages as well as scheduled maintenance. Historic realized 
availabilities are reported for nuclear plants.49 However, approximated availabilities have to 
be used for conventional thermal capacity. These are mainly derived from older statistics 
(VGB 1998) covering the years until 1997 before the liberalization process increased the 
value of data in the market. VGB 1998 contains data both on planned as well as unplanned 
outages which are added to one exogenous availability parameter. As no further data is 
available, we assume 5% outage probability for stochastic outages in every month and for all 
technologies. Gas turbines are an exception as they are more reliable (2% outage probability). 
Planned outages are assumed to vary between 0% (January, February) and 5% (May to 
September). We assume the same monthly values for all years. 
Start-up cost parameters for the different technologies have been collected from power plant 
construction companies. About half of the costs for a cold start are due to attrition. Depending 
on fuel prices, start-up costs for a cold start are in the order of magnitude of 10 Euro/MW for 
an open-cycle gas turbine and 45-50 Euro/MW for a hard coal plant. The parameter for the 
cool-down function varies by technology. For example, open-cycle gas turbines cool down 
much faster than hard coal fired plants. The parameters are also discussed in Kreuzberg 
(2001). 
Fuel prices (Figure 23) are gathered from different sources. Hard coal prices for Northwestern 
Europe (free on board Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Antwerp) can be obtained from McCloskey’s 
Coal Report. For each model region, an average markup for transshipping and transportation 
to plant site is added. Cross border gas prices are taken from Heren Energy’s European Gas 
Markets. These commercial sources generally have low time lags in data publication. Fuel oil 
prices are provided by the Federal Statistical Office Germany.  
                                                 
49  Nuclear plant availability data for Germany can be found on www.vgb-power.de. 
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Figure 23: Monthly Fuel Prices at Plant, Germany 2001 [Euro/MWh ncv] 
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Figure 24 illustrates monthly demand data for Germany. Total demand is covered by non-
dispatchable sources and “regular generation” optimized by the model. The corresponding 
axis for columns of model generation and aggregated non-dispatchable energy is on the left of 
Figure 24. Non-dispatchable energies are the aggregate of wind power generation, run of river 
generation, combined heat and power generation, and energy generated by other sources. 
Disaggregated generation by these energy sources is also shown (in lines) and corresponds to 
the right axis of the figure.  
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Figure 24: Monthly Model Demand and Generation by Non-dispatchable Energies, 
Germany 2001 
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As shown in Figure 24, total demand as well as residual model demand during the summer 
was much lower than during the winter months. This is caused by relatively cold and dark 
winters on the one hand and relatively modest summers and little air conditioning during 
summer on the other hand. Contra intuitively, demand in February seems to be low. However, 
this is simply caused by using unweighted monthly figures. Since February 2001 had 28 days, 
total energy consumption was naturally lower than in January and March. Demand data is 
derived from different publications by the Federal Statistical Office Germany50 in connection 
with UCTE’s hourly load profiles. Annual and monthly electricity consumption figures for 
other model regions are often published by national statistical offices. Additional data for 
many regions can be found at the regulators’ home pages. 
Model demand has to be corrected for the generation of non-dispatchable electricity sources. 
The reason is that non-dispatchable generation capacity does not react on scarcity signals. 
Hence, their dispatch cannot be optimized by a cost-minimizing model. Wind power is a 
typical example. Due to their extremely low variable costs, wind plants produce as much 
                                                 
50  One example is Statistisches Bundesamt (ed.), 2000-2003. 
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electricity as wind conditions allow. Wind power generation in Germany increased from 9.5 
terawatt hours (TWh) in 2000 to an estimated 17.5 TWh in 2003. We see in Figure 24 that 
wind power generation is very volatile over the year. It is also very volatile from day to day. 
However, as we only analyze three characteristic days in each month, we neglect this effect 
by assuming an average and identical wind for all three days. However, we consider 
variations in the average generation over the day. In the summer months, maximal daily wind 
generation (during midday) can be up to 70% above minimal generation (at night). In the 
winter months, these hourly variations are much lower. Data on wind power generation were 
provided by ISET e.V. 
Non-dispatchable generation also contains run of river generation. Depending on hydrological 
conditions, about 17 TWh of electricity are generated by run of river plants. The large 
monthly variations of hydro run of river generation can also be seen in Figure 24. Run of river 
production variations over the hours of a day are minimal. While generation profiles vary 
between months, we assume the same profile for working day, Saturday and Sunday. 
Generation by combined heat and power plants is also deducted from gross demand to 
calculate model demand. However, their covering is more complicated as these plants 
produce both heat and electricity in a combined production process. The dispatch decision for 
these plants is influenced by electricity prices but other restrictions such as heat demand 
constitute limiting factors. For the calculation of marginal costs, we divide these plants into 
two groups. The dispatch of plants with a high power-to-heat ratio is assumed to be driven by 
electricity prices and is endogenously optimized. Plants with a low power-to-heat ratio are 
treated as exogenous non-dispatchable generation. Their capacity is not included in the 
optimization process and their production reduces model load. Additional examples of non-
dispatchable production are renewable energy sources besides wind and hydro, waste 
combustion, and electricity produced for railways. Information on industrial CHP generation 
in Germany is made available by VIK. In addition, the lag of published data on CHP 
generation is partially solved by using another model of EWI51. 
                                                 
51  A description of this CHP model called CEEM can be found http://www.ewi.uni-koeln.de. 
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In total, 115 TWh of non-dispatchable generation are deducted from German demand in the 
year 2000. Production for the remaining 417 TWh is endogenously optimized in the model.  
Hourly model demand for the representative week is then calculated as follows: Firstly, total 
annual energy consumption for a region is obtained from available statistics. Secondly, 
monthly shares are used to break demand down to a monthly level. Thirdly, available data on 
the hourly structure of load are used to get hourly load curves for the representative working 
day, Saturday and Sunday. As described above, the same approach is taken for the non-
dispatchable generation. To get the final model demand, the non-dispatchable hourly 
generation is subtracted from gross demand. It is important to note that demand is exogenous 
and price inelastic in the model. While this is an approximation (avoiding non-linearities), 
short-run price elasticity of demand is very small in electricity markets.  
 
7.2 Appendix B (to chapter 4) 
In the following, we give the algebra of the complete model. Following the GAMS notation, 
parameters (lower case letters) are exogenous and variables (capital letters) are endogenously 
determined as result of the optimization process. 
Indices  Unit 
,...,t 1 T=  Hour  
,...,s 1 S=  Supply technologies  
 ,..., nfs 1 s=  Inflexible supply technologies (unable to balance 
forecasting error), e.g. nuclear, lignite, hard coal, 
CCGT 
 
 ,...,nf 1s s S+=  Flexible supply technology (can balance forecasting 
error), e.g. gas turbines, hydro-storage, pump-storage 
 
 s S=  Last technologies in technology set is the hydro-
storage and pump-storage technology 
 
Appendix 100 
,...,r 1 R=  Realization of forecasting error  
Parameters   
rθ  Probability of forecasting error realization  
td  Expected demand MW 
rc  Reserve capacity ready to balance forecasting error MW 
e
tw  Expected wind generation MW 
,t rρ  Realized forecasting error for wind generation MW 
X
sc  Variable costs for production Euro/MWhel 
U
sc  Variable costs start-ups Euro/MW 
PL
sc  Variable costs for part-load operation Euro/MWhel 
m
sx  Maximal capacity available for production MW 
mp  Maximal capacity available for hydro pump storage 
plants’ pumping 
MW 
η  Efficiency for hydro pumping plant operation  
me  Energy Budget with which hydro-storage and pump-
storage plants enter the day 
 
Variables   
TC  Total Cost (objective) Euro 
, ,s t rX  Production MW 
, ,s t rU  Start-Up MW 
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, ,s t rD  Shut-Down MW 
,t rP  Pumping MW 
 
The objective function of global cost minimization is transformed into a maximization 
problem, to stick to standard OR formulation: 
(35) ( ) ( ), , , , , , , ,, ,max * * * *T S R tX PL U plr s t r s s s t r s s u r s u r sX U D t 1 s 1 r 1 u 1TC X c c U c U D cθ= = = = − = − − + + −  ∑∑∑ ∑  
s.t.  
Production must cover realized demand (plus pumping): 
(36) , , , ,
S
e
t t r t r t s t r
s 1
d w P X 0ρ
=
− + + − =∑  ,r t∀  dtλ  
Capacity producing must be started up: 
(37) ( ), , , , , ,ts t r s u r s u r
u 1
X U D 0
=
− − ≤∑  , ,r s t∀  ,sus tλ  
Capacity ready for operation that is unable to provide reserve (balance ,r trr ) must be constant 
over all realizations of ,r trr : 
(38) , , ,s t r s tU U=  , ,nfs s s t r∀ ≤ ∀  ,us tλ  
(39) , , ,s t r s tD D=  , ,nfs s s t r∀ ≤ ∀  ,ds tλ  
Minimum part-load operation: 
(40) ( ), , , , , ,* ts s u r s u r s t r
u 1
U D X 0α
=
− − ≤∑  , ,s t r∀  , ,pls t rλ  
Installed capacity must exceed capacity started up: 
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(41) ( ), , , ,t ms u r s u r s
u 1
U D x 0
=
− − ≤∑  , ,s t r∀  , ,caps t rλ  
Capacity for positive reserve provision: 
(42) ( ), , , , ,
nf
nf 1
s t S
e m
t t r t s u r s u r s
s 1 u 1 s s
d w rc U D x 0ρ
+= = =
− + + − − − ≤∑∑ ∑  , ,s t r∀  ,rest rλ  
Two equations determine the dispatch of hydro-storage and pump-storage capacity. Hydro-
storage and pump-storage are combined to one single technology: 
(43) , mt rP p 0− ≤  ,t r∀  ,pct rλ  
Hydro-storage and pump-storage budget: 
(44) ( )" ", , ,T mS t r t r
t 1
X P e 0η
=
− − ≤∑  r∀  ,pt rλ  
 
7.3 Appendix C (to chapter 5) 
The following lemma is applied to transform (DP) into (DP*): 
Lemma 1: 
Let nn xy ℜ∈ℜ∈ , , 
{ }: , 0 1ny x y x A xΛ = ∃ ≤ ≤ ⋅ ≤  and { }njyAy jnj ,...,1;1 1 =≤⋅=Λ +−π   
where jA  as defined above. 
It is: πΛ=Λ  
Proof: 
Let Λ∈y , i.e. ( ): and0 1nx y x A x∃ ≤ ≤ ⋅ ≤ . 
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It follows that 1
1
1
1... +−
+−=
= ≤










=⋅≤⋅
∑
∑
jnn
jn
j
jj
x
x
xAyA
ν
ν
ν
ν
 because 
1
1
≤−= ∑∑∑
+==
−+
=
n
j
nj
xxx
µν
ν
µν
ν
µ
µν
ν  for all 1,...,1 +−= jnµ  (using that 0,1 ≥≤ ∑∑
+==
n
j
n
xx
µν
ν
µν
ν  for all 
1,...,1 +−= jnµ ). 
Therefore, πΛ∈y  and hence πΛ⊆Λ . 
Now, let πΛ∈y . Then, it is to show that ( ): and0 1nx y x A x∃ ≤ ≤ ⋅ ≤ . We construct x  
applying the following algorithm: 
Step 0:  Set yx = . If xA ⋅≤0 , then “end“. Otherwise, go to next step. 
Step 1:  Be )(* xk  the largest index with property 0
*
<∑
=
n
k
x
ν
ν . 
  Set 
*
*
*
1
n
l k
x x k
x x k
ν ν
ν ν
ν
ν
= +
′ = ≠
′ = − =∑  
Step 2:  Set x x′= . If xA ⋅≤0  holds, then “end“. Otherwise move back to step 1. 
  
x~  has the following properties: 
(a) x x′ ≥  
(b) x π′∈Λ  
(c) * *( ) ( )k x k x′ <  or 0 A x′≤ ⋅  
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The algorithm is finite because of (c). It follows from (a), (b), and (c) that the algorithm 
determines x  with the desired properties. However, it remains to be shown that the three 
properties hold for x′ : 
Ad (a): Follows from x xν ν′ = for *k≠ν and * * *
*
n
k k k
k
x x x xν
ν =
′ = − ≥∑  (because 0
*
<∑
=
n
k
x
ν
ν ). 
Ad (b): If no *( )k x′  exists, then 0 A x′≤ ⋅ . Otherwise, * *( ) ( )k x k x′ <  follows from 
*
* * * *1 1 1
0 0
n n n n
k
k k k k
x x x x xν ν ν ν
ν ν ν ν= = + = + = +
′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + = − + = ≥∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . 
Ad (c): We have to show that for nj ,...,1=  and 1,...,1 +−= jnb  follows: 
1
1
b j
b
xν
ν
+ −
=
′ ≤∑ . 
If bk <*  or 1* −+> jbk  this follows from x xν ν′ = for *k≠ν and πΛ∈x . 
If 1* −+≤≤ jbkb  we have :  
* * *
*
* * *
1 1 11 1 1
1 1 1
b j b j b jk k n k n
k
b b b b b jk k k
x x x x x x x x xν ν ν ν ν ν ν ν
ν ν ν ν νν ν ν
+ − + − + −− − −
= = = = = += + = + = +
′ ′ ′ ′= + + = − + = −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
∑−
=
≤
1*k
b
x
ν
ν , because 0≥∑
+=
n
jb
x
ν
ν  (Note: 
** 1 kkjb >+≥+ ) 
1≤ , because πΛ∈x .  
There is Λ∈y  and hence we have shown the corollary: Λ⊆Λπ .   
Proof of Theorem 1: 
(DP) can be written as follows: 
>< 0,min λd  
0 1i n i
i i
vc
sc sc
λ λ− − ⋅ ≤  and n
i
i
sc
A 10 ≤⋅≤ λ  for si ,...,1= . 
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Applying corollary 1 with 
i
ni
sc
vcy 10 ⋅−−= λ and 
i
i
sc
x λ=  leads to the following equivalent 
representation: 
>< 0,min λd  
1
0 11 +−≤⋅−−⋅ jn
i
ni
j sc
vcA λ , nj ,...,1= , si ,...,1=  
Slightly rephrasing that expression and applying that 11 1j n n jA j − +⋅ = ⋅  lead to: 
>< 0,min λd  
10 1)()( +−⋅⋅+≤−⋅ jniij vcjscA λ , nj ,...,1= , si ,...,1=  
Theorem 1 follows from the definition of jγ  and transforming 00~ λλ −= .   
Proof of Theorem 2: 
We stated in theorem 2 that an optimal solution *x  to PP* can be calculated with the 
following algorithm: 
*
1nx = knk d,...,1min=  
* *
,..., 1
min ( )ij k slk i i jx d x= + −= −∑   where the sum is over 
( ) { } { }( ) { }, , 1, , 1 , 1, , 1 1s l s i l n s s i l j n i s l k∈ < = − + ∪ = = + − + ∩ + ≥ +… … . 
Proof: 
Suppose 1 1 1 1 11 11 2 1 1( ,..., , ,..., )
n n n n n
n n nx x x x x−′ ′ ′ ′ ′=      is optimal with 11 1,...,min
n
n kk n
x d=′ < . Note, that 
1
1 1,...,
minnn kk nx d=′ >  is impossible without the permissibility of partial load. It that case, we must 
have  
(45) 
1
1 1
1 1
1 1
0
n n i
n n
ij ij n n
i j
j n
x a d x a
− +
= =≠
′ ′⋅ = − ⋅ >∑ ∑   . 
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As an implication of (45), we can construct indices meeting the following properties:  
1. 1 0, 1,...,
l l
n
i jx l L′ > =  This first property obviously ensures that all 1l lni jx′  are strictly 
positive. 
2. njii LL =−+= 1,11  This property ensures that the production schedule starts at the 
beginning and ends in the last period. 
3. 1,...,1,1 −=< + Llii ll  The third property means that the schedule moves strictly to the 
right, each starting point is later than the one before. 
4. 2l l li j i ++ <  This means that there must be a positive distance between the end of slice 
l  and the beginning of slice 2l + .  
5. 1,...,1,11 11 −=−+<−+ ++ Lljiji llll  This property states that the end points also 
move to the right. 
These indices are constructed as follows: firstly, define ( )
1 0
1,...,
max
nxik
k n
j i k
′ >
=
=

. Secondly, the first 
index is given by ( )1 1 11,i j j i= = . Following indices are determined by the minimum: 
( )( ){ }1 1minl l ll i s i s s j s i ji i+ ∈ ∈ < + > + −= ` , ( )1l lj j i+ = . Finally, the procedure finishes with indices Li  and 
( )L Lj j i=  if 1L Li j n+ − = . 
Once these indices fulfilling (1) to (5) are constructed, it follows as an implication that 
1 1
1
1
1 1
l l l l l l
L L
i j n i i j i
l l
a a a + +
−
+ −
= =
= +∑ ∑ . 
{ }
1,...,
( ) min 0, ,i ii st sc t vc t nγ == + ⋅ ∀ = …  is both monotone and concave with respect to t . Using 
standard properties of such a function (Avriel 1976) we can show that: 
∑ ∑
=
−
=
−+ ++≤
L
l
L
l
ijinj llll
1
1
1
1
γγγ . 
Hence, we can determine a new valid optimal solution: 
1 1 1 1
1,...,
min , 1,...,
l l l l l l
n n n
i j i j i jl L
x x x l L=′ ′ ′= − =    
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1,...,
min , 1,..., 1
l l l l l l l l l l
n n n
i i j i i i j i i jl L
x x x l L+ + + ++ − + − =′ ′ ′= + = −    
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1 1 1 1
1 1 1,...,
min , 1,...,
l l
n n n
n n i jl L
x x x l L=′ ′ ′= + =    
This procedure can be repeated until 11
1,...,
minn
l l
mn
i j kk n
x d=′ =  for an nm1 . The procedure is finite 
because ),( ** ll ji  with * *
1 1
1,...,
min
l ll l
n n
i j i jl L
x x=′ ′=   is not needed and remains zero in all following 
iteration steps. Because the number of possible index combinations is finite, the procedure 
ends after a finite number of steps. 
The reasoning for the following values is analogous, based on the fact that all components of 
vector *
( , )
sl
s l iterated
d x− ∑   are strictly greater zero.    
As a remark, it is impossible that an optimal solution found in a single step has components 
exceeding zero. As we postulate, they will be equal to zero. This follows from the structure of 
the restrictions which necessarily force them to be zero (see first case). 
This iterative procedure unambiguously determines all components of 
* * * * *
1 11 2 1 1( ,..., , ,..., )n n nx x x x x−=     . Hence, it must be a solution to the problem. 
Lemma 2 (Solution to the Algorithm Is Unambiguous) 
If ji dd ≠  for all ji ≠ , then the optimal solution determined with the algorithm described is 
unambiguous. Note that ji dd ≠  is a very weak assumption in reality as it is very reasonable 
to assume that id
+∈\ . 
The proof for this lemma follows directly from the proof of theorem 2. Because the solution 
to the algorithm is strictly larger than zero, exactly n  of the *ijx  are larger than zero and the 
solution is a non-degenerate corner. Hence, the dual solution is unambiguous. 
Proof of Corollary 2 
The zero profit condition is fulfilled for the whole market as a direct result of the duality 
theorem applied to (DP*) and (PP*) and related complementarity conditions:  
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* * *
0
* *
0
*
0
ˆ, ,
ˆ ,
,
Tx x A
Ax
d
γ λ
λ
λ
=
=
=
 
  with 
( )
1 11 2 1 2 1 11
1
2
ˆ ,..., , ,..., ,...,n n
n n
A a a a a a−
+
  =   
	
   
When we apply the mapping ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1,...,s s sn nx x xπ π π=    (where 
( ) ,
0,
ij j s ss
ij
x sc j vc
x
otherwise
γπ = + ⋅= 
 ) to the above relations, we can derive the zero profit 
conditions for every technology (again using the complementarity conditions): 
( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * *0 0 0ˆ ˆ, , , ,s s T s sx x A A x dπ γ π λ π λ λ= = =    where sd  is the share of demand 
supplied by technology s .   
An Example for the Algorithm Determining the Optimal *ijx : 
In the following, we will illustrate the algorithm determining the optimal *ijx . We do this for 
an example where we assume n=6 and ( )3,1,9,7,5,4kd = . We assume ji dd ≠  so we receive 
an unambiguous solution (Lemma 2).  
We start the algorithm by setting 
*
15x = 1,...,5min 1kk d= =  
The other *ijx  of the optimal solution * * * * *1 11 2 1 1( ,..., , ,..., )n n nx x x x x−=      should optimally be 
determined backwards starting with *1 1nx − . 
{ } { }{ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
{ }
{ }
* *
14 1,2,3,4
( , )
( 1, 5 )
1
* * * *
1 15 2 15 3 15 4 15
1 2 3 4
min ( )
min , , ,
min 1, 1, 1, 1
min 2,0,8,6
0
k slk s l
s l
s l k
x d x
d x d x d x d x
d d d d
= ∈
∪ = =
∩ + ≥ +
= −
= − − − −
= − − − −
=
=
∑ 
   
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{ } { }{ }
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
{ }
* *
13 1,2,3
( , )
( 1, 4,...,5 )
1
* * * * * *
1 14 15 2 14 15 3 14 15
1 2 3
min ( )
min , ,
min 0 1 , 0 1 , 0 1
min 2,0,8
0
k slk
s l
s l
s l k
x d x
d x x d x x d x x
d d d
= ∈
∪ = =
∩ + ≥ +
= −
= − + − + − +
= − + − + − +
=
=
∑ 
     
 
{ } { }{ }
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ }
{ }
* *
12 1,2
( , )
( 1, 3,...,5 )
1
* * * * * *
1 13 14 15 2 13 14 15
1 2
min( )
min ,
min 0 0 1 , 0 0 1
min 2,0
0
k slk s l
s l
s l k
x d x
d x x x d x x x
d d
= ∈
∪ = =
∩ + ≥ +
= −
= − + + − + +
= − + + − + +
=
=
∑ 
     
 
{ } { }{ }
( ){ }
( )
* *
11 1
( , )
( 1, 2,...,5 )
1
* * * *
1 12 13 14 15
1
min( )
min
0 0 0 1
2
k slk s l
s l
s l k
x d x
d x x x x
d
= ∈
∪ = =
∩ + ≥ +
= −
= − + + +
= − + + +
=
∑ 
     
( ) ( ){ } { }{ }
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
* *
24 2, ,5
( , )
( 1,1 ,..., 1,5 , 2, )
1
* * * * * * *
2 12 13 14 15 3 13 14 15
* * *
4 14 15 5 15
min ( )
, ,
min
,
min 0,8,6,3
0
k slk
s l
s l
s l k
x d x
d x x x x d x x x
d x x d x
= ∈
∪ = =∅
∩ + ≥ +
= −
 − + + + − + + =  − + − 
=
=
∑… 
      
  
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( ) ( ){ } ( ){ }{ }
( ) ( )
( )
( )
* *
23 2, ,4
( , )
( 1,1 ,..., 1,5 , 2,4 )
1
* * * * * * * * *
2 12 13 14 15 24 3 13 14 15 24
* * *
4 14 15 24
min ( )
, ,
min
min 0,8,6
0
k slk
s l
s l k
x d x
d x x x x x d x x x x
d x x x
= ∈
∪
∩ + ≥ +
= −
 − + + + + − + + + =  − + + 
=
=
∑… 
        
  
 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }{ }
( ) ( )( )
( )
* *
22 2, ,3 ( , )
( 1,1 ,..., 1,5 , 2,3 , 2,4 )
1
* * * * * * * * * * *
2 12 13 14 15 23 24 3 13 14 15 23 24
min ( )
min ,
min 0,8
0
k slk s l
s l k
x d x
d x x x x x x d x x x x x
= ∈
∪
∩ + ≥ +
= −
= − + + + + + − + + + +
=
=
∑… 
            
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ){ }{ }
( )( )
* *
21 2
( , )
( 1,1 ,..., 1,6 , 2,3 , 2,4 , 2,5 )
1
* * * * * * *
2 12 13 14 15 22 23 24
min( )
min
0
k slk
s l
s l k
x d x
d x x x x x x x
= ∈
∪
∩ + ≥ +
= −
= − + + + + + +
=
∑ 
        
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } { }{ }
( )
( ) ( )
( )
* *
33 3, ,5
( , )
( 1,1 ,..., 1,5 , 2,1 ,..., 2,4 3, )
1
* * * * * *
3 13 14 15 22 23 24
* * * * * *
4 14 15 23 24 5 15 24
min ( )
,
min
,
min 8,6,3
3
k slk
s l
s l
s l k
x d x
d x x x x x x
d x x x x d x x
= ∈
∪ = =∅
∩ + ≥ +
= −
 − + + + + + =  − + + + − + 
=
=
∑… 
     
     
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } { }{ }
( )
( )
( )
* *
32 3, ,4
( , )
( 1,1 ,..., 1,5 , 2,1 ,..., 2,4 3, 3 )
1
* * * * * * *
3 13 14 15 22 23 24 33
* * * * *
4 14 15 23 24 33
min ( )
,
min
min 5,3
3
k slk
s l
s l
s l k
x d x
d x x x x x x x
d x x x x x
= ∈
∪ = =
∩ + ≥ +
= −
 − + + + + + + =  − + + + + 
=
=
∑… 
      
    
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }{ }
( )( )
( )
* *
31 3
( , )
( 1,1 ,..., 1,5 , 2,1 ,..., 2,4 3,2 , 3,3 )
1
* * * * * * * *
3 13 14 15 22 23 24 32 33
min( )
min
9 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 3
2
k slk
s l
s l k
x d x
d x x x x x x x x
= ∈
∪
∩ + ≥ +
= −
= − + + + + + + +
= − + + + + + + +
=
∑ 
         
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } { }{ }
( )( )
( )( )
* *
51 5
( , )
( 1,1 ,..., 1,5 , 2,1 ,..., 2,4 ,..., 4,1 , 4,2 )
1
* * * *
5 15 24 33 42
min( )
min
min 4 1 0 3 0
0
k slk
s l
s l k
x d x
d x x x x
= ∈
∪ ∅
∩ + ≥ +
= −
= − + + +
= − + + +
=
∑
#
 
     
Once the *ijx  are determined, we can set up the set of equations defining 0iλ . We know that all 
those * 0ijx >  give us a binding equation. Hence, 
*
15 01 02 03 04 05 5
*
11 01 1
*
33 03 04 05 3
*
32 03 04 2
*
31 03 1
1
2
3
1
1
x
x
x
x
x
λ λ λ λ λ γ
λ γ
λ λ λ γ
λ λ γ
λ γ
= ⇒ + + + + =
= ⇒ =
= ⇒ + + =
= ⇒ + =
= ⇒ =





 
In a first step, we can use *31 03 11x λ γ= ⇒ =  to determine 04 2 03 2 1λ γ λ γ γ= − = − . From there, 
it follows in a next step that *33 05 3 03 04 3 23x λ γ λ λ γ γ= ⇒ = − − = − . The last component of the 
price vector is then 02 5 01 03 04 05 5 1 3λ γ λ λ λ λ γ γ γ= − − − − = − − . 
An Example Illustrating the Proof of the Algorithm in Theorem 2 
Figure 25 shows indices meeting the criteria 1. to 5. specified in the proof to the theorem. In 
the left figure (1), we have an exemplary problem with 5n =  periods and demand 
(3,1,9,7,4)Td = . Furthermore, (1) has an exemplary production schedule which is sub-
optimal as 11 1,...,min
n
n kk n
x d=′ < . We start the production schedule for all capacity started in period 1 
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( 11
n
jx′ ) in dark grey and move step by step to a very light grey for all capacity started in the last 
period ( 151
nx′ ).  
Figure 25: Indices Meeting Criteria 1. to 5. 
1i
1j
1 1
1n
i jx′
2i
2j
3i
3j
2 2
1n
i jx′
3 3
1n
i jx′
1 2
 
Out of this schedule, we select three 1
l l
n
i jx′  satisfying 1. to 5. These are 1 11 113n ni jx x′ ′=  , 2 21 132n ni jx x′ ′=  , 
3 3
1 1
51
n n
i jx x′ ′=  . In (2), these are moved vertically on the X-axis and relabeled 1l lni jx′  with 1, ,3l = … . 
Do these selected 1
l l
n
i jx′  satisfy the proposed conditions 1. to 5.? They satisfy the first property 
as 1 0
l l
n
i jx′ >  for all 1, ,3l = … . They also satisfy 2. as the first selected x starts in period one 
1 1i =  and the schedule ends in n (the last x is 151nx′ , where 1 5 1 1 5L Li j n+ − = + − = = ). The 
third property 1,...,1,1 −=< + Llii ll  is also satisfied as 1 2 31 3 5i i i= < = < = . In can be seen in 
the figure that the fourth property is also satisfied. It is also clear from the analytics as 
1 1 34 5i j i+ = < = . The fifth property is satisfied: 1 1 2 2 3 31 3 1 4 1 5i j i j i j+ − = < + − = < + − = . 
As a result: 
1 1
1
1
1 1
l l l l l l
L L
i j n i i j i
l l
a a a + +
−
+ −
= =
= +∑ ∑  
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1 1 2 1 1 2 3 2 2 3
13 32 51
1
1
1 15 16 31 50
1
1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1
1 1 0 2
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1
1
1
1
1
1
l l
l l l l
L
i j
l
L
n i i j i i i j i i i j i
l
a a a a
a a a a a a a a+ +
=
−
+ − + − + −
=
                        = + + = + + =                         
= + = + + = + +
   = +   
∑
∑
50
0
0
1
0
0
a
    +   
 
1
1
3 2 1 5 1 0
1 1
l l l l
L L
j n i j i
l l
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ+
−
+ −
= =
= + + ≥ + = + +∑ ∑  
In the result, a generation slice of 1 11 min l l
n n
n i jl
x x′′ ′=   is added to 11 nnx′  to get closer to the optimal 
schedule. 113 0
nx′′ =  in the new solution. Furthermore, we know from the construction of the 
algorithm that 113
nx′′  will remain equal to zero for all future iterations. 
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